Volume 108
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 108,
2003-2004
10-1-2003

General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic Tort Cases
Alani Golanski

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Alani Golanski, General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic Tort Cases, 108 DICK. L. REV. 479 (2003).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol108/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic
Tort Cases
Alani Golanski*
I.

Introduction

The traditional tort elements in a negligence cause of action are
duty, breach of duty, proximate causation, and injury.1 Each of these
terms is infused with legal meaning, and policy considerations typically
govern their construction. The emergence of a toxic torts jurisprudence,
from out of the larger domain of the law of civil wrongs, has helped
accentuate the policy-sensitive nature of the conventional tort elements.
A sensitivity to policy breeds controversy. In the toxic tort cases
and legal scholarship, most of the buzz has been on the concept of
proximate causation. This Article focuses on the issue of actual
causation, the factual aspect of the larger proximate causation inquiry.
More specifically, the normative question is what standard ought to
govern actual causation determinations in toxic tort litigations. To
illustrate the reformist tide, one influential view has been that the
causation element should be abolished altogether in actions alleging
exposure and harm coinciding with the corporate distribution of toxic
products.2 Another has been that a general statistical showing of
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1. Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 2001); Jobe v. ATR
Mktg., 87 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1996).
2. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2140 (1997) (arguing

that a new legal standard of corporate product liability should be formulated that
eliminates the plaintiffs' burden of establishing causation); Carl F. Cranor & David A.
Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort
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enhanced risk that appears to satisfy the more-likely-than-not legal
standard should alone suffice to establish actual cause.3
This Article rejects the first proposal, critiques the second, and
ultimately sides with a variant of the new statistical approach to
causation in toxic tort cases. Toward these ends, Part II briefly discusses
the factors that motivate the paradigm set forth by those who would
abolish causation (the "abolitionists") in this context. The abolitionists
both presuppose the very general causation finding that their proposal
inveighs against, and depreciate the current system's ability to pin
liability on distributors of toxic products. In the final analysis, their
proposed solution would be unstable.
Part III discusses the alternative articulation by some jurists of an
epidemiological substitute for specific causation proofs. The primary
focus will be on judicial treatment of the notion that proof of a two-fold,
or 2.0, epidemiological increase in relative risk may satisfy the civil
more-likely-than-not burden of persuasion. This Part also suggests that
differential diagnoses-which eliminate competing causal explanations
Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 46
(2001) (contending that tort law may have to be modified to deal with the lack of
understanding of the causal properties of toxic substances); Glenn Shafer, Causality:
Causalityand Responsibility, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1811, 1834 (2001) (relying on Berger,
advancing a probability claim that a defendant should pay under certain circumstances
regardless of the harm caused); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the
Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 852 (1997) (arguing that
causation requirements should be reformed because they provide manufacturers with an
incentive to remain ignorant about the hazards of their products); see also Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 162, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(Hon. Jack B. Weinstein) (asserting that "[t]here is considerable merit in Profesor [sic]
Margaret A. Berger's suggestion that traditional general causation proof is so difficult in
toxic tort cases that it should not be required, but that alternative elements of the cause of
action should suffice"). Regarding Blue Cross & Blue Shield of NJ., Inc., it should be
noted that Berger's article articulating the noncausal model appeared as part of a
Columbia Law Review symposium issue in tribute to Judge Weinstein. Moreover,
Weinstein and Berger have collaborated. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.12[3] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed.,
Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
3. See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. v. E. I. Dupont, 292 F.3d
1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing "how epidemiological proof can be adapted to
meet the 'more likely than not' burden of proof by requiring statistics to reflect a relative
risk factor of 2.0 before a plaintiff can recover"); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184
F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11 th Cir. 1999) (stating that the threshold for concluding that a
toxic substance more likely than not caused a disease is 2.0, because a relative risk
greater than 2.0 implies a greater than 50 percent likelihood of causation); Magistrini v.
One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 591 (D.N.J. 2002) (asserting
that causality may be inferred from an epidemiological assessment of relative risk, and
therefore that "the threshold for concluding that an agent was more likely than not the
cause of an individual's disease is a relative risk greater than 2.0") (quoting Michael D.
Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 384 (2d ed. 2000)).
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in a particular case-should emerge as the primary mechanism by which
bonus probabilities may be assigned to those epidemiological proofs that
indicate less than a two-fold relative risk ratio.
Part IV then evaluates the practical efficacy of a bright-line legal
assessment of epidemiological evidence. When judges create or refine
legal standards, the pull is naturally in the direction of bright lines that
both secure the present decision and supply guidance for future decision
making. The two-fold relative risk finding in epidemiological studies
provides such a bright line, but the probativeness of such an outcome in
vacuo may be illusory. For example, validity threats may plague
epidemiological findings that otherwise point to the powerful likelihood
of a causal connection; by the same token, ideal studies indicating even a
minor relative risk increase may be significantly probative in conjunction
with the case-specific elimination of confounding factors.
Finally, Part V addresses the theoretical issue of whether
epidemiological evidence-even assuming an ideal study free of validity
threats-should be admitted in legal cases at all, either as the sole
evidence of causation when they establish a greater than 2.0 relative risk
factor, or in conjunction with case-specific proof when they do not. This
Article takes the position that the epidemiological evidence should be
deemed admissible, both to address the abolitionists' concerns, and
because law and society would likely consider the resulting evidentiary
mechanism to be legitimate.
II.

Beyond the Abolitionist Program

The "abolitionists"-this Article's term for those who propose to
abolish the causation element of proof in toxic tort lawsuits-lament
that, in toxic tort litigations, unlike traditional tort cases, causality is
profoundly elusive both because biology does not afford clear and
distinct explanations of the causal mechanisms by which toxic exposures
produce birth defects, cancers, and other diseases, and because such
medical problems are not usually traceable back to any one particular
source. 4 A conventional demonstration of "but for" causation is
therefore impossible. 5
Under the noncausal model proposed by Margaret Berger, a
professor at the Brooklyn Law School-upon which model the
abolitionist program is based-courts would impose liability in
negligence for failure to provide adequate information relating to product
risks, and proof that the failure had caused plaintiffs injury would not be

4.
5.

Berger, supra note 2, at 2120-21.
Id. at 2122.
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required.6 Berger's later qualifications, however, suggest that her model
ultimately remains a causal one, and that her model's corrective work is7
accomplished merely through a burden-shifting mechanism.
Consequently, says Berger, defendants should be given the opportunity
to prove that exposure to their product could not plausibly have resulted
in certain adverse health reactions, or should be entitled to a reduction in
factor, such
damages if they are able to establish that some other causal
8
as smoking, contributed to the particular plaintiffs injury.
In other respects, however, the causal presuppositions that course
through Berger's model are less obvious. She proposes, for instance, that
"[i]f a corporation fails to exercise the appropriate level of due care, it
should be held liable to those put at risk by its action, without regard to
injuries that eventually ensue." 9 By this language, Berger presupposes
that a corporation's liability under her model will be predicated on some
minimal finding that there are risks associated with its product. The
corporation, moreover, will be held liable to those "put at risk."10
Requisite to any such finding of risk, however, is some showing of a
product's general capability of causing harm.1" Accordingly, when
examined closely, it becomes clear that Berger's model presupposes that
the finding of a general causal capability is a precondition to the
imposition of liability. Thus, by assuming the existence of the very
factual element that the abolitionist paradigm is committed to
eliminating, that paradigm is rendered incoherent.
Berger's proposal is also deficient in a couple of other important
respects. First, Berger claims a moral impetus for her model, which
stems from the imperative of providing injured plaintiffs with "equitable
compensation." ' 12 She criticizes the requirement that plaintiffs prove
actual causation on this ground, citing the "enormous transaction costs"
that this requirement may entail.13 But in the final analysis, Berger's
model admittedly also fails to provide plaintiffs with "a full measure of
6. Id. at 2143.
7. Id. at 2144-45.
8. Id.
9. ld. at 2134.
10. Id.
11. See also id. at 2144 ("According to this model, once plaintiffs proved the
manufacturers' negligence in failing to reveal substantial information highly relevant to
assessing the potential risks of asbestos exposure, a prima facie case of liability would be
made out for those able to substantiate exposure and ill health."); see generally Envtl.
Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that, to conclude
that certain pesticides "pose a carcinogenic risk to humans..., the Administrator must
show a causal connection between the uses of the pesticides challenged and resultant
exposure of humans to those pesticides").
12. Berger, supra note 2, at 2150.
13.

Id.
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traditional damages."' 14 Berger replaces transaction costs with trade-off
costs, conceding that "[i]n exchange for relieving plaintiffs of having to
prove general causation, a possible fair trade-off might be to release
defendants from having to pay for plaintiffs' pain and suffering," as well
as punitive damages, and to provide them with a defendant-favorable
method of damage scheduling.' 5 It is not immediately apparent that
transaction costs would ordinarily exceed the value of such trade-off
concessions, and it seems reasonable to suppose that, indeed, the latter
would often far surpass the former.
As a further difficulty, Berger proposes that, under the noncausal
scenario, a corporation that distributed toxic substances would not be
liable if it could show that it had not violated its duty to inform itself and
others about the risks created by its product.' 6 Yet here Berger curiously
brackets the ample skepticism about corporate motivations that otherwise
impels her project. For what reason is there to assume that a defendant
that would recklessly imperil masses of workers and consumers by
burying its head in the sand when it comes to product dangers, would
sponsor and interpret research in an unbiased manner under the new
noncausal regime?
The abolitionists' impulse is well-intentioned. They believe that
traditional tort doctrine gives corporations a substantial incentive to bury
their heads in the sand when it comes to the health and safety risks posed
by their products "because the future likelihood that a causal connection
can be proved between the corporation's conduct and plaintiffs injury
appears minimal compared to the cost of present compliance."' 7 This
view, too, may be an overreaction.
For one thing, the problem
historically has been not so much a failure to suspect a causal link
between the toxic substance and health problems, but rather a negligent,
reckless, or willful refusal to disclose this possibility to workers,
consumers, or the public. 18 In the current causal system, however, if a
14. Id. at 2145.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2148.
17. Id. at 2134.
18. See, e.g., Affidavit of Charles J. Roemer, former Chairman, Paterson Industrial
Commission, In re Johns-Manville Corp., Debtors Civ. No. 465-83C/1-84C/688-83C
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Sept. 29, 1982), reprinted in BARRY 1. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS:
MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 152-54 (2d ed. 1986) (describing statements of Vandiver
Brown, General Attorney and President of Johns-Manville Corporation, that, although
"Johns-Manville's physical examination program had, indeed, also produced findings of
X-ray evidence of asbestos disease among workers exposed to asbestos,... it was JohnsManville's policy not to do anything nor to tell the employees of the X-ray findings"
because such a company approach would be "foolish" because "if Johns-Manville's
workers were told, they would stop working and file claims against Johns-Manville, and
that it was Johns-Manville's policy to let them work until they quit work because of
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product's risk or hazard is scientifically discoverable, the
court will
9
impute this knowledge constructively to the manufacturer.
In the resulting regulatory regime, if any entity investigated the
causal risks associated with a substance or product, the corporate
manufacturer or seller is deemed to have been privy to the investigator's
findings. Moreover, the defendant is under a continuing duty to
investigate and warn, and any discoveries that could have been made
during the period of distribution or exposure are also attributed to that
defendant. 20
If neither the scientific, technological, nor industrial
communities research the risks associated with a substance, and no risk
of a causal nexus is ever framed, it is difficult to comprehend the legal
mechanism by which liability could acceptably be imposed. The link
between a negligent actor and some harm afflicting a party who happens
to have been exposed to that actor's conduct (or product) is literally
nothing if not causal.2'
It should be relatively uncontroversial that the state itself may
justifiably fine or otherwise punish the sort of negligence the
abolitionists identify. But a discrete acausal compensatory subsystem
within the larger tort regime would be vulnerable to destabilization by
the corporate sector's perennial clamor against the perceived illegitimacy
of a new species of strict liability resulting in multimillion, and perhaps
asbestosis or died as a result of asbestos-related diseases").
19. George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1990) (agreeing that a
manufacturer of a toxic product "is held to the knowledge of an expert in its field"); Borel
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973) (concluding
that, as a constructive expert, the manufacturer has a duty to "keep abreast of scientific
knowledge, discoveries, and advances and is presumed to know what is imparted
thereby," and also to test fully and inspect its products to uncover all dangers that are
scientifically discoverable); see also Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th
Cir. 1985); Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1957); 1 Louis R.
FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.22[l], at 2-1062-64 (1990)
(collecting cases, and reporting that the "manufacturer must keep abreast of scientific
advances and is under a duty to make tests to ascertain the nature of its product. In this
scientific age the manufacturer undoubtedly has or should have superior knowledge of his
product").
20. See, e.g., Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 94 Civ. 5279 (SAS), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7727, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1996) (affirming that the manufacturer's duty to warn of
all potential dangers which it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, to exist, "does not cease at the time a product is manufactured or sold; rather, a
manufacturer has a continuing duty to warn of dangers it discovers thereafter"); Cover v.
Cohen, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 385 (1984) (holding that a manufacturer may "incur liability
for failing to warn concerning dangers in the use of a product which come to his attention
after manufacture or sale, through advancements in the state of the art, with which he is
expected to stay abreast, or through being made aware of later accidents involving
dangers in the product of which warning should be given to users").
21. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (reiterating
that "[p]roof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do") (citation omitted); see also
Black v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 219 F. Supp.2d 243, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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22
multibillion, dollar outcomes.
Thus, while some theory-minded legal scholars are understandably
engaged by an abolitionist platform that seems both politically
progressive and informed by an ethic of care,23 it seems reasonable to
assume that the abolitionists' position will not withstand the test of time.
The tort system's machinery is likely adaptable enough to incorporate
sufficiently pliant standards of causality to address complex and
nonobvious causal mechanisms. A more resilient response to the largescale toxic tort phenomenon preserves the causation element while
adjusting in the area of the case-specific evidence that must be
adduced.24
Moreover, even in typical tort cases, proofs of actual causation are
not ordinarily rooted in scientifically precise demonstrations of causal
mechanisms. In other words, when it comes to the causal element, the
divide between the typical tort and the toxic tort scenario may not be as
distinct as the abolitionists presuppose. Nor does the cognitive maneuver
in a toxic tort case involving little-understood biological mechanisms
necessarily depart radically from that in the garden variety tort action.
Under either scenario, the fact finder hears of exposure and subsequent
harm, and may or may not infer a causal connection. In either event, the
precise causal mechanism is unobserved, perhaps unobservable, and the
trier infers to the best explanation. 25 The philosopher David Hume
taught that we cannot induce necessary causal connections from

22.

See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products

Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1992) (documenting

the erosion of strict tort liability and commenting that "[f]aced with the choice of holding
manufacturers liable for dangers unknowable at the time of manufacture or abolishing
strict products liability altogether, courts and legislatures have elected the latter course");
see also ROBERT L. RABIN & MARC A. FRANKLIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 442-600 (5th ed. 1992) (reporting that "strict liability" has been on the
wane in products liability caselaw since the late 1980s); see generally Charles Nesson,
The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1373 (1985) (discussing evidentiary rules that arguably safeguard
"the legal system's concern for continuing acceptance of the verdict" and "the stability of
judgments"); cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (indicating that legal
institutions are self-conscious not to create regimes that leave them "vulnerable" to
perceived "illegitimacy").
23. See Virginia Held, Reason, Gender and Moral Theory, in PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 321-44 (supplement, Fall 1990), reprinted in ETHICS:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 677, 683 (Steven M. Cahn & Peter
Markie eds., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that proponents of a new "'ethic of care' ... think it
should supersede 'the ethic of justice' of traditional or standard moral theory").
24. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
25. See generally MICHAEL DEVIT, REALISM AND TRUTH 44-46 (2d ed. 1991);
Gilbert Harman, Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation, 5 AM. PHIL. Q. 164, 168
(1968).
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observing mere regularities,2 6 and the regularities of constant conjunction
are all we can observe, even when the Mack truck strikes.
A response to the toxic tort dilemma that should better harmonize
with the current flow of tort jurisprudence, and that will likely be more
enduring than outright abolition of the causal element of proof, involves
a turn toward the sort of statistical approach that is increasingly
countenanced in American courts. Indeed, jurists have been moving
closer to acceptance of a statistical alternative to traditional causal
proofs.
The most notable development concerns the use of
epidemiological studies to establish specific, and not solely general,
causation. The remainder of this Article examines the prospects and
problems associated with this development.
III.
A.

The Epidemiological Alternative to Specific Causation in Caselaw
The Limits of Specific Causation

Plaintiffs in personal injury cases establish the element of specific
causation when they show that a defendant's misconduct-or plaintiffs'
exposure to the defendant's product-actually caused the plaintiffs'
specific injuries. 27 In toxic tort litigations, plaintiffs also discretely
proffer evidence of general causation, which establishes that the
substance they were exposed to is capable of causing the injury or
disease with which they are afflicted. 8
General causation is
automatically established when an actual causal connection has been
shown, because something that has caused an effect is necessarily
capable of causing that effect. 29 But toxic tort litigations ply the two
causal levels apart.3 °
26.

DAVID

HUME,

AN

ENQUIRY

CONCERNING

HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING
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(Prometheus Books 1988) (1748) (concluding that "we are never able, in a single
instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the
effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only
find, that the one does actual, in fact, follow the other").
27. Amorgianos v. AMTRAK, 303 F.3d 256, 268 (2d Cir. 2002); Kelley v.
American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 881 n.9 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
28. Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 268; In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,
751 (3d Cir. 1994); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714-15 (Tex.
1997); see Susan Epstein, Comment: Tort Reform To Ensure the Inclusion of Fertile
Women in Early Phases of Commercial Drug Research, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
355, 377 (1996) (explaining that "[t]here are two levels of proof for causation in toxic tort
suits: general causation and specific causation").
29. Cf Tyra v. State, 897 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (analogously
emphasizing that "a thing which actually causes death is, by definition, 'capable of
causing death') (citing TEXAS PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(17)(B)).
30. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence
After Daubert, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 896-97 (1994) (explaining that "[n]owhere has
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Although the idea of a second level of causal proof in toxic tort
jurisprudence may at first glance suggest a heightened evidentiary
burden for plaintiffs, 31 the general causation element functions to justify
relaxing the level of specific causation evidence that would otherwise be
required. Establishing specific causation under traditional standards
would be "oppressively problematic" in the toxic tort area 32 because
these cases typically involve long latency periods between exposure and
illness, as well as disease types that may be associated with multiple
causal factors. 33 At the same time, the specific causation requirement
usually endures in some form,34 and plaintiffs who establish a
may still fail to demonstrate that
substance's general harmful propensity
35
injury.
their
caused
it probably
In some cases, researchers can design and administer controlled
scientific experiments to gauge whether a substance is capable of causing
a particular condition or injury, and such an experiment could yield
objective criteria with which to underwrite the inference of specific
causation in a particular case. 36 In an increasing variety of toxic tort
the bifurcation of the standard of causal proof between general causation, based on
probabilities, and specific causation, based on individualized factual connections, been as
pronounced as it is in the toxic tort case").
31. See, e.g., Danielle Conway-Jones, FactualCausation in Toxic Tort Litigation:A
Philosophical View of Proofand Certainty in UncertainDisciplines, 35 U. RICH. L. REV.
875, 894 (2002) (gleaning that "[t]he current trend in toxic tort cases, however, is to erect
substantive and procedural obstacles, for example, a dual factual causation test").
32. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort
Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 Hous. L. REv. 369, 372 (2001).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th
Cir. 1973) (concluding that, although "it is impossible, as a practical matter, to determine
with absolute certainty which particular exposure to asbestos dust resulted in injury to
Borel... the jury could find that each defendant was the cause in fact of some injury to
Borel," who was generally exposed to all defendants' products); Rutherford v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219 (Cal. 1997) (products liability case brought by estate
of worker exposed to asbestos-containing products and died of lung cancer, holding that
"plaintiffs may prove causation in asbestos-related cancer cases by demonstrating that the
plaintiff's exposure to defendant's asbestos-containing product in reasonable medical
probability was a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the
plaintiff or decedent inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of developing asbestosrelated cancer, without the need to demonstrate that fibers from the defendant's particular
product were the ones, or among the ones, that actually produced the malignant growth").
35. See Joseph Sanders, Complex Litigationat the Millennium: Kumho and How We
Know, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 373, 385 n.1 16 (2001).
36. See Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1212 (10th Cir. 2002)
(describing procedures of "rechallenge" (exposing a patient to the same suspected causal
substance) and "dechallenge" (removing that substance) that "resemble controlled
experiments" and that may effectively inform the specific causation question); Adams v.
Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1095 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stressing that, "[w]hen
an association is identified among variables, a controlled experiment will help identify
which independent variable caused the effect"); see also Adams v. Ameritech Servs.,
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cases, however, it is not feasible to experiment directly, and there will be
little apparent case-specific basis on which to infer specific causation.3 7
B. JudicialDevelopment of an EpidemiologicalAlternative
1.The Early Views
The question arises whether causation may be inferred from general
causal evidence that is not case specific. As stated, judges in toxic tort
cases have been somewhat open to the idea of a statistical alternative to
traditional causal proofs. 38 The most notable issue before the courts has
been whether epidemiological studies-relevant in determining general
causal capabilities-may be used as the sole or predominant evidence of
specific causation.39
An epidemiological study compares the incidence rates of disease
among otherwise similarly-situated exposed and unexposed groups.4 ° In
the epidemiologist's discipline, the significant factor is not absolute risk,
but relative risk. 4 1 A disease rate across populations, regardless of
Inc., 231 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2000); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. 1I, 911 F. Supp. 775,
803 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (reiterating that the causal inferences that can be drawn from
observational studies "'rest on a less secure foundation than that provided by a controlled
randomized experiment"') (quoting FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 351 (1994)); see generally Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the
Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with
Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REv. 1033, 1077-78 (2001) (stating that, of three
procedures for collecting data, anecdotal evidence, observational studies, and controlled
experimentation, "controlled experiments are widely considered the best method for
testing theories of causation").
37. See Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715 (Tex. 1997).
38. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.: Maiorana v. United States
Mineral Prods. Co., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1995) (agreeing that statistical
"epidemiological evidence is indispensable in toxic and carcinogenic tort actions where
direct proof of causation is lacking").
39. See generally Schneck v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., Civ. No. 92-4370 (GEB), 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17486, at *100 (D. N.J. June 25, 1996) (noting the controverted issue
in the litigation concerning the purported "limitations on epidemiology's ability to prove
individual causation").
40. See generally MICHAEL R. ALDERSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EPIDEMIOLOGY
(1976);
ABRAHAM M. LILIENFELD & DAVID E. LILIENFELD, FOUNDATIONS OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY 3 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that "[e]pidemiology is concerned with the
patterns of disease occurrence in human populations and of the factors that influence
these patterns"); KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 23 (1986) ("The
fundamental task in epidemiologic research is thus to quantify the occurrence of illness.
The goal is to evaluate hypotheses about the causation of illness and its sequelae and to
relate disease occurrence to characteristics of people and their environment."); Linda A.
Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121 (1994).
41. See generally ALDERSON, supra note 40.
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exposure to any particular substance, yields an absolute risk of
contracting that disease.42 The determination of a relative risk, on the
other hand, yields the risk among the exposed group relative to the
general unexposed population.4 3
Perhaps the earliest judicial decision addressing the appropriateness
of using epidemiological relative risk findings for determining actual
causation was Cook v. United States.44 The plaintiffs in Cook claimed
that their rare neurological disorder, Guillain-Barre Syndrome ("GBS"),
had been caused by their federally-sponsored swine flu vaccinations. 5
By holding that the plaintiffs' epidemiological evidence was legally
insufficient to prove causation because it failed to show a relative risk
greater than twice the upper limit of the baseline risk,4 6 the court
implicitly sanctioned the significance of such a two-fold finding.
The Cook court reasoned that, whenever the relative risk to
vaccinated persons is greater than two times the risk to unvaccinated
persons, it is more likely than not-because there is a greater than 50
percent probability-that a given case of GBS afflicting a vaccinee has
resulted from that vaccination. 7 The court reasoned hypothetically as
follows:
Suppose the relative risk for vaccines nine weeks after vaccination is
two-i.e., that they are twice as likely to experience onset of GBS
after that interval as are persons in the unvaccinated population
during the calendar week. If fifty GBS cases occur among a million
unvaccinated persons that week, then a hundred cases would be
expected among a million nine-week vaccinees. Of that hundred,
fifty would have been expected without vaccination, while the other
fifty are explained only by the event of vaccination. Thus, the
likelihood that a given nine-week vaccinated case of GBS is
attributable to vaccination is 50%. Similarly, if the relative risk of
GBS to nine-week vaccinees is four, then 75% of all nine-week
vaccinees are vaccine-linked. Once the relative risk rises above two,
probable than not that a given case was caused by
it becomes more
48
the vaccine.

Other courts followed Cook in deeming an epidemiological showing
of a relative risk greater than two to be probative on the causation issue.49
42. See ROTHMAN, supra note 40, at 23.
43. See id.; Bailey et al., supra note 40, at 168.
44. 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D.Cal. 1982).
45. Id. at 307.
46. Id. at316.
47. Id. at 308.
48. Id. at 308 n. I (emphasis added).
49. See Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1434 (W.D.Mo. 1986), a/fd,
830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a relative risk of two or less means that
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Courts facing the issue thus appeared willing to accept an
epidemiological substitute for specific causal evidence if that statistical
proof established a greater than two-fold relative risk, and thereby
satisfied, in the judicial reckoning, the more-likely-than not standard.
Judicial reliance on bright-line standards offers guidance, creates
predictability, and engenders a certain comfort level in dealing with
technical issues. 50 The risk, however, is that a bright-line standard will
foster rigid decision making that may tend to provide false, unfair,
unreliable, or otherwise unintended outcomes. 5 1 In the present context,
problems arise when the judiciary institutionalizes a two-fold relative
risk standard.
Most obviously, the legal order then discounts
circumstances in which the particular plaintiff has actually been harmed
by a substance or in which the epidemiological studies indicate a relative
risk of 2.0 or less. 52 In such a situation, the bright-line standard would
engender what is known as a Type II error, a false negative outcome that
denies recovery to a meritorious claimant. 3 Strict adherence to the 2.0
standard would also, however, risk Type I error, involving false
exposure is not the probable cause of the disease at issue); Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D.Md.1986) (deeming risk ratios of 1.3 and 1.9 to be
insufficient to permit a finding of probable causation of harm by defendant's intra-uterine
device, saying that "a two-fold increased risk is an important showing for plaintiffs to
make because it is the equivalent of the required legal burden of proof-a showing of
causation by the preponderance of the evidence or, in other words, a probability of
greater than 50%") (emphasis added); see also Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814
F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 785
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.1987) (asserting that plaintiffs must prove
at least a two-fold increase in the incidence of the disease allegedly caused by exposure
to the suspected toxic substance); cf In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1223, 1261 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing the "strong" and "weak" versions of the
preponderance rule with respect to epidemiological evidence); see generally Michael D.
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The
Legacy ofAgent Orangeand Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 647 (1992).
50. See People v. P. J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 565 n.1 (1986) (Hancock, Jr., J.,
dissenting) (indicating that bright line rules create predictability, precision, and
guidance).
51. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 592 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (Plager, C.J., concurring) (lamenting that the majority's "attempt [in patent
law cases] to limit indeterminacy" with a set of bright-line rules adhering to the doctrine
of equivalence "trade[d] off areas of uncertainty for a degree of rigidity" and the
"potential for unintended.., consequences that may do nothing but exacerbate the
problem").
52. See Sana Loue, Epidemiological Causation in the Legal Context: Substance and
Procedures, in STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: STATISTICAL
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 263, 275 (Joseph L. Gastwirth ed., 2000) (commenting that

strictly applying a 2.0 risk ration "is ill-advised because it would a priori preclude
recovery by individuals actually harmed by a specific exposure where less than a relative
risk of 2.0 is demonstrated") [hereinafter STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY].
53. See id at 275-76.
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positives.5 4 Factually, alternative factors may have caused a particular
plaintiffs disease; methodologically, an epidemiological study finding a
greater than two-fold relative risk may be flawed 5
False negative outcomes are especially likely in jurisdictions that
view the 2.0 mark as an admissibility standard. This judicial move is
understandable, however. Rules of evidence prescribe that only relevant
evidence is admissible,56 and that evidence is only relevant if it tends to
make the existence of a material fact more probable or less probable than
it would be absent the evidence. 7 It would appear that a statistical study
that supports the conclusion that a causal relation was more likely than
not is, for that reason, relevant under the evidentiary standard. Thinking
the 2.0 relative risk
along these lines, a number of courts have deemed
58
finding to constitute an admissibility threshold.
During the early 1990s, courts around the New York area were
attempting to hash out the epidemiological issue when non-"signature"
diseases arose in the context of the asbestos litigation.5 9 In the Joint
54. David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 555, 568 (1995) (discussing and defining Type I and Type II errors).
55. Part III, infra, discusses a number of the potential flaws that may threaten the
validity of an epidemiological study.
56. See FED. R. Evtl. 402.
57. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
58. E.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11 th Cir. 1999)
(upholding the district court's ruling precluding the admission of study showing a 1.24
relative risk linking silicone exposure in breast implants to increased antinuclear
antibodies characteristic of plaintiffs thyroid disease); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that relative risk less than two offered to
show a causal link between Bendectin ingestion and birth defects "would not be helpful,
and indeed would only serve to confuse the jury, if offered to prove rather than refute
causation. A relative risk of less than two may suggest teratogenicity, but it actually
tends to disprove legal causation as it shows that Bendectin does not double the
likelihood of birth defects"); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958-59
(3d Cir. 1990) (concluding in Bendectin case that plaintiffs would have to establish a
relative risk of greater than two to survive summary judgment); Sanderson v. Int'l
Flavors & Fragrances, 950 F. Supp. 981, 999-1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (in suit for personal
injuries arising from plaintiffs exposure to fragrances emanating from Boss, Drakkar
Noir, Stetson, Joop! Homme, Calvin Klein's Obsession, Davidoff's Cool Water, and
Freesia perfumes, court relies on Ninth Circuit's conclusion that findings of a relative risk
less than two, linking such exposures to plaintiffs injuries, would "not be helpful, and
indeed would only serve to confuse the jury, if offered to prove rather than refute
causation"); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996)
(holding that, "[t]o support admissible expert opinions, epidemiological evidence must fit
the legal as well as the substantive issues of the case," and that, because the relevant legal
standard in proving proximate causation is whether the silicone breast implants at issue
were more likely than not a substantial causal factor in producing the plaintiffs' atypical
connective tissue disease, "plaintiffs must be able to show a relative risk of greater than
2.0").
59. The issue of linking various diseases to workers' asbestos exposures was
pronounced when these workers were afflicted with such non-signature diseases as colon
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Eastern & Southern DistrictsAsbestos Litigation,6 ° for example, the U.S.
District Court considered the case of John Maiorana, a former sheetmetal worker who died of colon cancer at the age of forty after having
been occupationally exposed to asbestos-containing products. 6' As
would be expected in such a case, the plaintiffs causal evidence was
epidemiological.62 The court concluded, however, that studies showing a
merely "elevated" risk of colon cancer for asbestos-exposed individuals
were not "admissible" to establish a causal connection because, absent
any direct evidence of causation, a plaintiff can meet the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard only by showing that asbestos exposure has a
relative risk greater than 2.0 for colon cancer. 61
In Landrigan v. Celotex Corporation, a New Jersey State appellate
court similarly concluded that, where the occupational history of 17,800
insulators exposed to asbestos revealed fifty-nine deaths from colon
cancer, in a study population for which thirty-eight deaths were
"expected," the relative risk of 1.55 did not sufficiently demonstrate
causation. 64
The court disconcertedly took the view that an
epidemiological study must show a relative risk in excess of two in order
to be statistically significant.6 5

cancer or lung cancer. Peter H. Schuck, Commentary: JudicialAvoidance of Juries in
Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAuL L. REV. 479, 498 (1998). Asbestosis is characterized
by the presence of asbestos fibers in lung tissue. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc, 751 F.
Supp. 649, 655 (E.D. Tex. 1990). Malignant mesothelioma is a particular type of lung
cancer the only known cause of which is exposure to asbestos, and which ordinarily
involves a latency period of twenty to thirty-five years. See Leon S. Gottlieb, The Range
of Medical Abnormalities Resultingfrom Asbestos Exposure, reprintedin SOURCEBOOK
ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL,

LEGAL AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS-ASBESTOS

DISEASE UPDATE 1-35 (Special Supp. Mar. 1989); see also Karen Hamm Antman,
MalignantMesothelioma, 303 N. ENG. J. MED. 200-02 (1980).
60. 758 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
61. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 964 F.2d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1992).
62. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 758 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
63. Id. at 202-03 (acknowledging a "strong" epidemiological result finding that for
certain individuals with significant levels of asbestos exposure, the relative risk of colon
cancer was 1.68, with a 95 percent confidence range of between 1.34 and 2.09, but stating
that Maiorana's asbestos exposure level did not appear high enough to place him in this
high risk group).
64. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 579 A.2d 1268, 1272 (App. Div. 1990).
65. By way of explanation, a test of statistical significance gauges whether the null
hypothesis can be rejected. See Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victims and the Death
Penalty: Inside and Outside the Courtroom: Victim Impact Testimony and the
Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 434 P.91 (2003). If the null
hypothesis is rejected, then the effect found in a sample is said to be statistically
significant. Id. Before conducting a statistical analysis, the experimenter chooses a
significance level, traditionally called 'qc,' which although subjective is traditionally set at
5 percent. See DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN
LITIGATION 34 (1986). The lower the significance level, the more the data must diverge
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey overturned the appellate court's
reasoning in Landrigan.66
The court distinguished the judicial
gatekeeping role in determining admissibility from the scientist's role in
designing, implementing, and drawing conclusions from epidemiological
studies.6 7 Thus hinting at a contextualist paradigm that accounts for the
different epistemic circumstances of the scientific expert and the
judiciary,68 the court recognized that lay decision makers could not be
expected to know technical and scientific matters in the way experts in

from the null hypothesis to be deemed significant; the significance level chosen
determines the probability of a Type I error. Id. at 33-34. Importantly, a statistically
significant effect is not necessarily practically significant. David H. Kaye, DNA
Evidence: Probability,Population Genetics and the Court, 7 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 101,
126-27 (1993). In the epidemiological context, with higher numbers of study subjects, a
lower relative risk will be considered statistically significant. See generally Gerald W.
Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proofand
Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 261 (1993); James J. Schlesselman,
Sample Size Requirements in Cohort and Case Control Studies of Disease, 90 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOL. 365 (1969). When the numbers of cases are very low, relative risk must
approach 2.0 to be deemed significant; with larger numbers of cases, relative risk may
hover about 1.5 and be considered significant on the issue of causal capability. See
generally DAVID HILDEBRAND,

STATISTICAL THINKING FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTS

(1986).
66. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992).
67. Id. at 1086; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97
(1993) (recognizing that "there are important differences between the quest for truth in
the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject
to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and
quickly").
68. Contextualism is a theory of knowledge that asserts that an individual's
knowledge claim is relative to his epistemic context. See ROBERT J. FOGELIN,
PYRRHONIAN REFLECTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION 208 (Oxford Univ. Press
1994) (emphasizing that "[u]nderstanding what a whole 0 is involves understanding what
will count as a part-and this will vary with context"); David B. Annis, A Contextualist
Theory of Epistemic Justification, 15 AM. PHIL. Q. 213 (July 1978); Keith DeRose,
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 913
(1992); Robert Hambourger, Justified Assertion and the Relativity of Knowledge, 51
PHIL. STUDIES 241, 262 (1987) (explaining that "we should say that there really is only
one sense of 'know' involved here, but that the amount of evidence it requires for us to
know something varies with indefinitely many standards of caution"); David Lewis,
Elusive Knowledge,74 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 549, 550-51 (Dec. 1996) (saying that
ascriptions of knowledge, like much of what we say, are context-dependent, and that
infallibilist epistemology (or even epistemology generally) is maybe "a context that
makes them go false. Then epistemology would be an investigation that destroys its own
subject matter .... In the strict context of epistemology we know nothing, yet in laxer
contexts we know a lot"); see also LUDWIG WiTrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 2 2e (2nd ed., G. Elizabeth M. Anscombe trans., Blackwell Publishers
1997) ("If I tell someone without any further explanation: 'What I see before me now is
composite,' he will have the right to ask: 'What do you mean by "composite"? For there
are all sorts of things that that can mean!'-The question 'Is what you see composite?'
makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity-that is, which
particular use of the word-is in question.").
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their respective disciplines do.69 More specifically, the Landrigan panel
stated that the court's role is not to describe "how to structure an
epidemiological study, analyze the data, draw conclusions about the
study population, and, if possible, extrapolate from statistical results
inferences about specific individual subjects. 7 ° The court instead
assumes the higher order task of evaluating the expert's own
explanations of the factual bases and methodologies used in the studies
to determine whether the expert's opinion "will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. 71
This epistemological posture is incompatible with strict adherence
to a judicially-imposed relative risk standard. Instead, any such bright
line would appear sensible only if the epidemiological community itself
abided by such a marker. Yet the New Jersey high court did not go quite
so far as to defer to the scientific or epidemiological community's own
judgment about whether the strength, consistency, and plausibility of a
statistical association warranted a causal inference in any particular legal
case. 72 It did not, that is, flatly rule out judicial reliance on a strict 2.0
69. Landrigan,605 A.2d at 1086.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting N.J. EVID. R. 56(2)). In a similar vein, in the later context of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), one commentator interpreted Karl Popper's falsifiability criterion of
evaluation to entail "a conception of the scientific method that people standing outside of
science could apply to determine whether purported scientists are in fact doing science."
Adina Schwartz, A 'Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need To Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v.
United States, 10 HARV. J.LAW & TECH. 149, 164 n.47 (1997). Consistently, Popper
took it to be "the first task of the logic of knowledge to put forward a concept of
empiricalscience, in order to make linguistic usage, now somewhat uncertain, as definite
as possible, and in order to draw a clear line of demarcation between science and
metaphysical ideas." KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 38-39
(Routledge 1992) (1959). But see Wendy E. Wagner, Judicial Review of Statistical
Analysis in EnvironmentalRulemakings, in STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY, supra note 52, at 282-83 (explaining that courts tend to be overly deferential to
definitive quantitative analyses, which in turn tends to discourage proffers of statistical
proof that more realistically express scientific uncertainties).
72. Strength of association correlates to the relative risk, whereas consistency of
association is gauged by comparing the cause and effect relation emerging "in one study
with the results of other studies and with other relevant scientific knowledge." See
Maiorana v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1995);
GARY D.FRIEDMAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 183-84 (3d ed. 1987). Friedman further
explains that an association attains plausibility if it makes sense in relation to known
biological mechanisms or other epidemiological background knowledge. Id.at 184. He
explains, for instance, that "[p]art of the attractiveness of the hypothesis that a highsaturated fat, high-cholesterol diet predisposes to atherosclerosis is the fact that a biologic
mechanism can be invoked. Such a diet increases blood lipids, which may in turn be
deposited in arterial walls. A correlation between the number of telephone poles in a
country and its coronary heart disease mortality rate lacks plausibility as a cause-andeffect relationship partly because it is difficult to imagine a biologic mechanism whereby
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threshold in the absence of other causal proof, but suggested instead that
there will ordinarily be some sort of case-specific evidence, even if
simply a record of asbestos exposure or, even better, the clinical presence
of asbestos at the tumor site.7 3
Under such circumstances, a study showing a relative risk less than
2.0 could support a finding of specific causation, and would be deemed
"one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to consider in
determining whether the expert has employed a sound methodology in
reaching his or her conclusion. 74 The court, in other words, remains
focused on its task of determining whether the expert herself possesses
the knowledge requisite to arriving at the conclusion; this is a threshold
judicial decision that is a function of whether the expert's scientific or
other evidence fulfills the court's admissibility criteria. If the expert
opines that a causal relationship exists with respect to the particular
plaintiff, but relies solely on an epidemiological finding of a less than
two-fold relative risk, then perhaps, as a legal matter, the expert's
testimony is not "based upon sufficient facts or data" and should be
excluded.7 5
This articulation followed another oft-cited New Jersey asbestos
opinion, Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corporation,76 in which the
intermediate appellate court rebounded from its clumsy ruling in
Landrigan. The Grassisreasoning merits quoting in some detail:
Defendants argue that there should be a threshold of a 2.0 correlation
before an expert should be permitted to rely upon an epidemiological
study. They urge that only when this figure is exceeded can it be said
that the particular factor is more likely than not to have produced the
particular injury. This assertion proves too much. Assuming a large
group of potential plaintiffs, a causative factor of 1.99 and significant
evidence eliminating other known causes, defendants' proposition
would still exclude the epidemiological proof. Even though the
physical problems of just under one-half of the plaintiffs (without
reference to the additional causative proof) would have been
statistically "caused" by the factor being studied, none could recover.
Yet, if a new study raised the risk factor to 2.01, all of the plaintiffs
could use the study to collect damages, although for nearly one-half
of the group, the risk factor was not an actual cause of the condition.

telephone poles result in atherosclerosis." Id.
73. Landrigan,605 A.2d at 1078.
74. Id.
75. FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000) (regarding the portion of Rule 702 added by the 2000
amendments in response to the United States Supreme Court ruling in Daubert,509 U.S.
579 (1993)).
76. 591 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
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77
This makes little sense, scientifically or legally.

Accordingly, the emerging jurisprudential view is that
epidemiological studies, which by their nature pertain to general causal
capabilities, are good evidence of specific causation, especially when
proffered in conjunction with some relevant non-statistical proof. Given
such a further evidentiary showing-the sort that is feasible in toxic tort
contexts, it should become less pressing upon the judiciary's collective
consciousness that epidemiological proofs be governed by a bright line
admissibility standard.
2.

The Dutch Book Dilemma

It is useful to try to better understand the intuitive draw of the 2.0
relative risk standard for evidentiary gatekeepers in legal cases. On the
one hand, any finding greater than 1.0 suggests that exclusion of the
causal evidence, or a finding of insufficiency on that element of the case,
chances Type II error involving a false negative legal outcome. 78 At
least some individual, in other words, whose disease did result from the
defendant's toxic product, would be denied her day in court.
On the other hand, policy considerations may deem this risk
acceptable, and implicitly deem true the null hypothesis stating that a
relative risk ratio less than 2.0 demonstrates the lack of any causal
association. 79 The dilemma resides in the fact that, although some
members of the afflicted population-being greater than expected but not
greater than twice that number-will have a valid causal claim against a
defendant, it is statistically less likely than not that any particulargroup
member will have such a claim. 80
Under such a circumstance, to argue that the causal explanation
nevertheless merits submission to the jury is to encounter what is known
as a "Dutch book" situation. 8 1 In a Dutch book event, a set of wagers is
such that under any circumstance the total pay-off is negative.82 The
difficult claim implicitly offered by proponents of the epidemiological
evidence in the legal context might be that, even though the statistical
probability of causation in any particular case is less than (or equal to) 50
percent, the causal explanation itself imbues the cause of action with
77. Id. at 676.
78. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (explaining the notions of Type I
and Type II error).
79. See Loue, supra note 52, at 275-76 (explaining that acceptance of the null
hypothesis when the inconsistent hypothesis is true constitutes a Type 1Ierror).
80. See supra note 58.
81. See BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, LAWS AND SYMMETRY 158 (1989).
82. Id.

2003]

GENERAL CAUSATION AT A CROSSROADS

bonus probability, permitting a finding that a causal connection is more
probable than not.
The philosopher Bas van Fraassen argues against the abductive
inferential reasoning process known as "inference to the best
explanation" ("IBE") by attempting to show that, in Dutch book style,
IBE makes us incoherent. 83 A brief review and critique of van
Fraassen's approach may engender insights useful in developing a fresh
approach to the problem of epidemiological proofs in legal cases.
Van Fraassen begins with an orthodox Bayesian actor,84 personified
as "Bayesian Peter," who "uses no ampliative rule, but only logic.' 85
Peter and we are given a statistical model for the probabilities that a die
is biased based on tossing results.86 The model introduces a factor X of
bias, which can come in N different degrees: X(l), . . ., X(N). 87 "If the
die has bias X(J), then the probability of ace on any one toss equals
I/N."8 8 Of course, this is not exactly right, because, for one thing, this
formula discounts the possibility of ace with an unbiased die. So van
Fraassen notes that the model as a whole has a certain bias.89
In all events, the focus is on the perfect bias, X(N), which gives ace
the probability (N/N) = 1; the graph van Fraassen provides indicates, for
instance, that the posterior probability of perfect bias (N = 10) after the
first four tosses coming up ace is 39.5 percent, and after the first ten
tosses 67 percent. 90 These posterior probabilities are updated after
further tosses by a "conditionalization" rule. 91 Ultimately, such a rule
gives rise to the predictive engine so important in testing scientific
hypotheses. Thus, under a perfect bias model, the probability of tossing
a fifth ace after the first four, once we have correctly weighted the
posterior probabilities to arrive at an average, is 87 percent, and of

83. Id. at 169.
84. "Thomas Bayes was an eighteenth-century minister (and mathematician) who
wanted to prove God existed based on the sample data that's the world." Alani Golanski,
Kahn's Reign and Its Metaphorsfor Law-A Critique in the Philosophy of Legal Culture,
27 S.U. L. REV. 89, 146 (2000). A Bayesian probability exercise is formulaic, and begins
with a prior probability that one adjusts in the light of new evidence, pursuant to a
likelihood ratio, to deliver a posterior probability. See generally MORRIS HAMBURG,
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR DECISION MAKING § 2.3, at 77-80 (4th ed. 1987); Laurence H.
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329, 1353 (1971) (discussing Bayes's Theorem).
85. VAN FRAASSEN, supra note 81, at 161.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 163.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 164.
91. Id. at 162 (stating that, to say that the orthodox Bayesian updates by simple
conditionalization is also to say that he "updates by Bayes's Theorem").
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drawing an eleventh, is 95.5 percent.
This is all quite abbreviated, and does not do justice to van
Fraassen's more extended explication, which is itself sometimes difficult
to follow. But let us trust that the field has been prepared for the attack.
Peter meets a "Preacher"-preaching his praise of IBE-who convinces
him "that the hypotheses of bias are like little or specialized laws, which
also have explanatory power," 93 and that, in light of this explanatory
success, bonus probabilities should be awarded to certain hypotheses.94
Accordingly, after a run of four aces, Peter redistributes his probabilities,
now assigning the probability of a fifth ace at 90 percent.95
Van Fraassen's experiment takes on new complexities, positing a
series of bets by which, if Peter relies on the 90 percent estimate, he will
be sure to lose come what may, and will even be able antecedently to
compute this inevitably on his own.9 6 "Thus, by adopting the Preacher's
rule, Peter has become incoherent-for even by his own lights, he is
sabotaging himself."97 If we commit to a rule for the revision of opinion,
it should probably entail a Bayesian extension of non-ampliative canons
of logic "to all forms of opinion and opinion change. 98 Accepting the
Preacher's rule that the explanatory aspect of a theory makes its
hypotheses more probable makes us incoherent.
It is difficult to grapple with Van Fraassen's Dutch book claim. It
probably reacts to such views as Gilbert Harman's (van Fraassen's
colleague in the Philosophy Department at Princeton), who said, "The
best explanation is more than just a highly probable explanation. It must
also make what is to be explained considerably more probable than
would the denial of that explanation." 99 More recently, Stathis Psillos, a
philosopher of science at the University of Athens, said that, by virtue of
its confirmational value, the explanatory aspect of a theory raises the
theory's probability. 100
Psillos, however, is assuming a context different from the one in
which van Fraassen's Preacher operates. Psillos considers a case in
which there are, let's say, ten theories, T1. . . . . To, each of which
10).101 Assume that we
explains a single phenomenon ei (i = 1 ....
92. Id at 163-65.
93. Id. at 166.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 169.
97. Id. (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 175.
99. Gilbert Harman, Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation, 5 AM. PHIL. Q. 164,
168 (1968).
100. STATHIS PSILLOS, SCIENTIFIC REALISM: How SCIENCE TRACKS TRUTH 224 (1999).
101. Id.
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arrive at theory T*, which unifies T, F1 T10 and is thus more informative
than any one of them, or even than their mere conjunction. On strictly
probabilistic grounds, the probability of T* will be less than or equal to
the any of the individual probabilities of TI 0] T 0. 0 2 But this "does not
show that the probability of T* cannot be high enough to warrant belief
....

Rather, it is some of the features of the potential explanation which,

having confirmational value, increase the theory's probability."' 03
So perhaps van Fraassen and proponents of IBE are speaking past
one another. If so, the character of the Preacher does not fulfill its
function of indicting IBE, but merely represents a misapplication of the
principle that, in the right circumstances, a theory's likelihood is
enhanced by virtue of its explanatory power. Intuitively, anyhow, this
would seem to be the case with respect to Psillos's T*. One example
may illustrate the cogency of that model.
Assume that T, explains that Stoplight B consistently switches from
red to green x t-units after Stoplight A does because the two are linked to
one another. T2 explains that Stoplight C is similarly linked to Stoplight
B, and so on through Stoplight Z. Each theory thus explains a single
phenomenon and entails a certain singular connection. After a time we
posit T*, which hypothesizes that all of the stoplights are hooked into a
grid for the entire city, and are thereby coordinated overall. T* entails
more, and is more informative, than any T1..... T,, or even than their
conjunction, T, & . . . & T,.

The strict probability of T* may be

constrained by the probabilities of the individual theories, but its
capability of uniting previously unrelated phenomena (e.g., the Stoplight
B-Stoplight A phenomenon and perhaps a Stoplight R-Stoplight Q
phenomenon) and of yielding novel predictions (e.g., Stoplight Q will
change04x + y t-units after Stoplight A) carries significant confirmation
value. 1
In van Fraassen's experiment, the Preacher touts the view that
explanatory power should translate into increased credence in the more
explanatory hypotheses.' 0 5 Bayesian Peter is led into incoherence when
he adjusts his probabilities accordingly. 10 6 But this is because, unlike the
situation involving Psillos's T*, the explanatory aspect of the hypotheses
of bias does not have an independent confirmational value. Nor should a
proponent of IBE argue otherwise. So the Preacher does not accurately
reflect the abductive position.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. This hypothetical can be framed in other terms to steer clear of constructed
systems, our likely prior knowledge or intuitions about city planning, and so on.
105.

VAN FRAASSEN, supra note 81, at 169.

106.

Id.
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From the perspective of this philosophical digression, it might seem
more understandable both that courts are drawn toward a strict 2.0
relative risk standard when it comes to admissibility decisions
concerning epidemiological studies, and that findings that do not exceed
the 2.0 threshold may nevertheless be deemed admissible when offered
in conjunction with some other evidentiary factors. In the former
circumstance, when the epidemiological study is the only evidence
grounding the plaintiffs causal claim, there seems to be no basis on
which to afford bonus probabilities to the causation proof When,
however, there is some other case specific factor-perhaps the plaintiffs
high exposure, perhaps asbestos fibers near the tumor site, perhaps a
differential diagnosis eliminating certain alternative causal possibilities
in the plaintiffs life-then the causal hypothesis may take on enhanced
confirmational value.
3.

The Confirmational Value of Differential Diagnoses

The principal barrier to establishing specific causation by
conventional methods in toxic tort actions concerns the causal
mechanism linking the substance to the disease. The problem, in other
words, concerns chiefly the causal capabilities of the toxic substance at
issue. What proof is there, for instance, that silicone exposure increases
the presence of injurious antinuclear antibodies? 10 7 How can a plaintiff
establish that Bendectin ingestion causes birth defects? 10 8 More than
100,000 substances or their derivatives are registered for use in
commercial applications, but researchers have studied the health
implications of only a small portion of these. 10 9 This is the difficulty to
which the abolitionists respond when they suggest that traditional causal
evidentiary requirements discourage corporations from researching
potential health hazards that may be associated with their products.1 10
Of less concern is the ability to identify and eliminate competing
causal explanations for diseases and disease-types. Whereas levels of
107. See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (11 th Cir. 1999)
108. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995); DeLuca
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
109. See Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable
Patternsof Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation:Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 (2001); James Huff & David Hoel, Perspective and
Overview of the Concepts and Value of HazardIdentification as the InitialPhase of Risk
Assessment for Cancer and Human Health, 18 SCAND. J. WORK ENV'T & HEALTH 83, 85

(1992) (estimating that there are as many as 100,000 chemicals in the marketplace); see
also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SCREENING AND TESTING CHEMICALS

IN COMMERCE 1 (1995) (estimating approximately seventy thousand chemicals in
commerce).
110. See Berger, supra note 2, at 2134.
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research about commercial products and their components may be
directly sensitive to the manufacturer's particularized corporate interests,
research into medical conditions and causal factors ordinarily flows from
a different and more diffuse political dynamic that exists within the
medical and scientific communities."' Corporate and scientific interests
ordinarily combine to promote, rather than suppress, the investigation of
medical afflictions, although deciding how to allocate resources2 toward
one disease type rather than another may be politically charged."
Thus, competing causal explanations for particular disease types
will generally tend to be accessible to litigants in a toxic tort proceeding.
Indeed, the problem for the toxic tort plaintiff often arises precisely3
because alternative causes have been identified for her type of disease." 1
For this reason, defendant corporations do have an incentive to marshal
available scientific knowledge to discover possible alternative etiologies,
thereby reducing 14 the estimated probability that their products have
caused the harm."
The understanding of competing sources of a disease or medical
condition has a double resonance for the defendant manufacturer; this
information decreases the likelihood of a causation inference linking its
111. See, e.g., Univ. of Copenhagen, Inst. of Pub. Health, Dep't of Health Services
Research, at http://www.pubhealth.ku.dk/stflindex-e.html (last visited May 5, 2003)
(noting that the Institute was established in 1997 to examine "the political control of the
health care sector, and its historical development").
112. See Robert C. L. Moffat, Legal Perspectives on Cloning: Cloning Freedom:
Criminalization or Empowerment in Reproductive Policy?, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 583, 599
(1998) (cautioning about "the risks and dangers of permitting political interference in the
conduct of scientific research"); Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing:In Search of a
Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691, 722 (1993) (discussing political implications of allocating
tax dollars to AIDS research and care).
113. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 755 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting district court's exclusion of testimony of expert who had "not even consider[ed]
alternative causes for various diseases"); Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry
Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 609 (D.N.J. 2002) (reiterating that, "'where a defendant
points to a plausible alternative cause and the doctor offers no reasonable explanation' for
why he still concludes that the chemical was a substantial factor in bringing about the
plaintiffs disease, 'that doctor's methodology is unreliable') (quotingPaoli, 35 F.3d
717, 760); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL Docket No. 1203, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1174, at *41 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2001) (stressing that "even when association
between exposure and disease exists, it must be determined 'whether the exposure causes
the disease or whether the exposure and disease are caused by some other confounding
factor"') (quoting REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 369 (2d ed. 2000)).
114. See Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that
the defendant's experts had discussed the probability that factors other than asbestos
exposure had caused the plaintiff's pleural lung disease); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J. 1992) (noting plaintiff's allegation that the defendants had
prodded the Council for Tobacco Research to sponsor research showing that factors other
than smoking caused the illnesses attributed to tobacco use), vacated by 975 F.2d 81 (3d
Cir. 1992).
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product to the plaintiffs malady, but it also equips the plaintiff with a
means of proffering a case-specific causal analysis that eliminates some
of the competing possibilities. Any such case-specific showing adds
confirmational value to the plaintiffs causal hypothesis, and may well
shore up the probative significance of an epidemiological proof that
comes up shy of the 2.0 threshold.
Accordingly, an alternative to the abolitionist idea for toxic tort
litigations--one that would overcome the jurisprudential and institutional
obstacles facing the all-out abolitionist program-combines general
causal epidemiological outcomes with differential diagnosis testimony.
A differential diagnosis tests a falsifiable hypothesis--e.g., that Mr.
Maiorana's asbestos exposure caused his colon cancer-by determining
whether the plaintiffs case-specific circumstances may rule out
alternative causes. 115 Nor should the admissibility of differential
diagnosis evidence be controversial. The medical community has widely
embraced this methodology, subjected it to peer review, and affirmed
16
that it infrequently leads to incorrect results.'
The cases reflect the medical community's view. In Cavallo v. Star
Enterprise,11 7 for instance, the court emphasized that the process of
differential diagnosis may significantly affect the determination about
specific causation because the preponderance of the evidence standard
may require ruling out other possible causes of an injury. 1 8 The
differential diagnosis, of course, will itself be subject to the court's
gatekeeping scrutiny, and may not be deemed admissible in a particular
case if the court finds it insufficiently reliable.1 19
115.

See generally DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

(Michael B. First ed., 4th ed. 1994).
116. See Berg v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 293 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.
2002); In re Paoli,35 F.3d at 758; Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969, 978 (6th
Cir. 1994) (recognizing that differential diagnosis is "a standard diagnostic tool used by
medical professionals to diagnose the most likely cause or causes of illness, injury and
disease").
117. 892 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996).
118. Cavello, 892 F. Supp. at 771; accord Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., 104 F.3d 1371,
1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting the importance, in the court's assessment, of an
explanation of the etiology of the disease, and of a showing of the implausibility of most
alternative causes).
119. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the an expert's differential diagnosis should satisfy the admissibility
criteria suggested in Daubert when that analysis is based on verifiable evidence and
scientific methodology that is well-accepted in the field); Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc.,
151 F.3d 269, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999)
(noting that the trial court has the discretion to conclude that a differential diagnosis is
not sufficiently reliable for the jury to consider); Cavallo, 100 F.3d at 1159 (commenting
that a speculative differential diagnosis, not supported by the available scientific studies,
is thus inadmissible).
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Moreover, differential diagnosis testimony is even more likely than
an epidemiological study to be accepted as the sole evidence of causation
ina case.12 Importantly, that testimony will be case-specific, and will
therefore align with the traditional method of establishing specific
causation. A plaintiff who proffers both epidemiological studies and a
differential diagnosis should therefore be in a fairly strong position.
Differential diagnoses will often, however, not eliminate all other
causal factors that may have contributed to a plaintiffs disease. A
physician might testify that the individual plaintiff, afflicted with cancer
and exposed to defendant's radiation, has never smoked, has a low-fat
diet, has no significant genetic susceptibility, and has no other
discernible conditions or circumstances that might create the predicate
for the onset of the disease.121 But a total elimination of competing
causes may frequently be unlikely.
It is especially under these circumstances that epidemiology and
differential diagnosis will be mutually reinforcing. Each will tend to
confirm the probative characteristic of the other, and the offer of each
will add confirmational value to the causal hypothesis overall.
Accordingly, for instance, one court stated that an expert need not
eliminate "each and every possible alternative cause,"' 122 especially when
epidemiology demonstrates the product's general injurious capability. 23
As the District of Columbia Circuit Court stressed in Ambrosini v.
120. See Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1209 (8th Cir. 2000) ("If a
properly qualified medical expert performs a reliable differential diagnosis through
which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, all other possible causes of the
victims' condition can be eliminated, leaving only the toxic substance as the cause, a
causation opinion based on that differential diagnosis should be admitted."); Westberry v.
Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a reliable
differential diagnosis alone may provide a valid foundation for a causation opinion, even
when no epidemiological studies, peer-reviewed published studies, animal studies, or
laboratory data are offered in support of the opinion).
121. See In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., Master Case File No. CY-913015-AAM, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15028, at *588-89 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 1998); see
also Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 675 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (holding that an epidemiological study finding relative risk of less than 2.0 was
admissible to prove that plaintiffs asbestos exposure had caused his colon cancer where
testimony ruled out other known risk factors, such as family history, diet, alcohol
consumption, and smoking).
122. Lakie v. Smith-Kline Beecham, 965 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D.D.C. 1997).
123. Id. (concluding that it was not "particularly significant that the doctors could not
affirmatively eliminate spontaneous chromosomal mutation as a cause of plaintiff's MDS
5 q-minus. . . . This burden would be particularly onerous in this case given that
spontaneous chromosomal mutation is a difficult phenomenon for scientists to
understand ....This plaintiff has established that there is a clear link between benzene
contamination and MDS. As a result, it is not fatal to the admissibility of plaintiff's
experts' testimony regarding specific causation that her experts cannot eliminate every
possible cause of her condition.").
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24 "[t]he
Labarraque,1
fact that several possible causes might remain
'uneliminated' ... only goes to the accuracy of the conclusion, not the
12
soundness of the methodology."' 1
By the same token, this Article proposes that reservations about the
admissibility or probativeness of epidemiological studies finding relative
risk ratios greater than 1.0 but not greater than 2.0 should be overcomeespecially as the ratio approaches the 2.0 threshold-when the plaintiff
has been able to supplement her causal presentation with valid
differential diagnosis testimony.

IV. Evaluating the Validity of Epidemiological Studies
A.

Introduction

Litigants proffering epidemiological studies, those challenging
either their admissibility or the weight that the trier of fact should afford
them, and courts seeking to rule on admissibility or simply to
comprehend the science, should be aware of possible study problems.
Whether the epidemiologist has undertaken a cohort study (prospectively
or retrospectively comparing the incidence of disease in the exposed
group to that within a group representing the general population) or a
case-controlstudy (retrospectively comparing people diagnosed with the
disease to those not having the disease), the central issue is always
12 6
whether a credible and valid causal claim has been established.
Certain questions immediately arise about the validity of an
epidemiological study. These include the following: have the subjects
been accurately tallied; have the disease cases been reported and
accounted for; are there detection problems resulting from the long
latency periods that characterize some etiologies; 127 have the case and
control populations remained constant or shifted over the course of the
study; were the subjects exposed to other hidden toxins; and more
generally, are there extraneous or confounding factors at play, such that
plaintiffs would have developed their diseases regardless of the
28
exposures being studied?
These issues and others are systematically treated in the literature
129
exploring various threats to the validity of epidemiological research.
124. 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
125. Id.at 140 (quoting Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482, 1487 (D.C.
Cir. 1993)).
126. See CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING Toxic SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE AND THE LAW 29 (1993).
127. See supra text accompanying note 33, and notes 44-46.
128. See generally CRANOR, supra note 126, at 29.
129. See THOMAS C. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION:
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An initial caveat is that, understandably, the foci of the medical and legal
factual analyses are not precisely the same. The scientific method
assesses the probability that the harm is associated with the exposure, as
well as the probability that the observed relationship may be an artifact
of the experimental process. 130 The scientific approach, in other words,
and such factors as the
concerns the mathematics of the relationship,
3
consistency and strength of that relationship.' 1
The legal fact finder, in some contrast, wants to know about the
actual event; the real-world physical connection between the plaintiffs
exposure to the defendant's product and the horrible ailment the plaintiff
brings into court. This distinction should not be overblown, however,
because in either event the recipient of the statistical informationwhether a scientist or a lay fact finder-will decide whether that
information is explanatory, and whether to draw a causal inference.
The question is thus always whether there are any problems that
prevent observers from drawing a valid causal inference from the
epidemiological data. The following subsections suggest some of the
problems that may arise in the scientific analytic process. Threats to
study validity have been widely discussed in the literature, 132 and so
subparts (B) through (D) merely highlight the most notorious offenders:
sampling error; measurement error; and design error and related
interpretive problems. The difficulties discussed are meant to be
illustrative, not exhaustive.
B.

Sampling Error

One problem that may threaten the validity of a social scientific
study arises when the researcher has erred in selecting a sample
population. 33 A general rule guiding social science research is that the
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES IN FIELD SETTINGS 39-40 (1979); FRANK HAGAN,
RESEARCH METHODS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY 129-41 (4th ed. 1997);

Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Confounding and Misclassificaton, 122 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 495, 495-506 (1985).
130. See David Barnes, Too Many Probabilities: Statistical Evidence of Tort
Causation,64 LAW& CONTEMP. PROB. 191, 191 (2001).

131. Id. at 197; see also Nesson, supra note 22, at 1358 (distinguishing statements
about the evidence presented at trial from statements about past acts and occurrences at
issue in the litigation).
132.

See generally DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND

QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963).
133.

See Clay Calvert, Toxic Television, EditorialDiscretion, & The Public Interest:

A Rocky Mountain Low, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 163, 196-97 (1998) (discussing
the FCC's rejection of a challenge filed by the Rocky Mountain Media Watch to the
license renewal of four local television stations-allegedly because the violence content
of their news broadcasts did not serve the public interest-on the ground that the
sampling size of news broadcasts used in Rocky Mountain's study was too small to
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size and quality of the sample selected must sufficiently represent the
characteristics of the population studied.134 The usefulness of even a
perfectly designed study may be limited if sampling errors have
occurred.
In the epidemiological context, the sample of cigarette smokers or
children of Bendectin users, for example, may be too small to support an
inference about the diverse population group studied. The study has to
be large enough to reflect that diversity, but not so large that a similarity
of non-exposure background variables becomes impracticable.' 35 Also at
times, the control population may, by chance, contain a large number of
individuals who are naturally immune to the disease at issue, out of
136
proportion to immunities occurring in the larger population.
Alternatively, from a toxic tort plaintiffs point of view, the control
population may contain a randomly excessive number of people
susceptible to the disease.
As a somewhat related point, characteristics peculiar to the study
group will threaten the "external" validity of the study-i.e., the validity
of generalizing the study outcomes. 37 It is possible that the causal
inference will not easily apply to other population groups, or to groups
exposed in different settings. In one study of the relationship between
oral hygiene and periodontal disease, 38 for example, the fact that the
participants, unlike the rest of us, cleaned their teeth under supervision
39
threatened external validity.1
C. Design Errorand InterpretiveProblems
Because epidemiological research seeks to convey causal
information, the studies must be designed to be sufficiently sensitive to
causal influences. At the design stage, the epidemiologist has to
determine whether the sample was representative of the overall effort of the stations
during their license terms).
134. EARL BABBLE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 226 (7th ed. 1995).
135. See Bloomquist v. Wapello County, 500 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1993) (reflecting
that a difficulty inhering in the use of epidemiological studies is that these "require large
numbers of patients whose backgrounds are similar in every respect except their exposure
to the suspected substance").
136. See Barnes, supra note 130, at 198 (emphasizing that such sampling error is "an
unavoidable property of inferential statistics"); see also David E. Bernstein, The
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2167 (1994) (saying that "[e]pidemiology is an inexact
science, and is prone to a range of methodological and sampling errors").
137. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 129, at 37.
138. Niklaus P. Lang et al., Toothbrushing Frequency as It Relates to Plaque
Development and Gingival Health, 44 J. PERIODONTAL 396 (1973).
139. See Jan Lindhe & Gary Koch, The Effect of Supervised Oral Hygiene on the
Gingivae of Children, 2 J. PERIODONTAL RES. 215 (1967).
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calculate the sample size most likely to meet the study's goals.1 40 She
has to perform a number of operations, such as adjusting sample size and
establishing the frequency with which to collect data, and settle on the
length of the study, in order to reckon how much statistical power the
study should afford to detect an effect of a given magnitude.14 ' A lack of
false negatives, hence overlooking
statistical power will tend to produce
42
causal connections that do exist.1
At the post-study interpretive stage, the researcher relies on the
known variances and sample sizes to compute the magnitude of the
effect that could have been reasonably detected with a certain level of
confidence, conventionally set at 95 percent. 43 When this established
interpretive approach leads to provisional acceptance of the null
hypothesis, the clinician will not be able to draw an epidemiologicallysupported causal connection in any particular case, even when there is
one.144 As a general rule, in their large population studies, researchersand the regulators who rely on them-will not deem very small
exposure to a toxic
elevations in the risk of disease accompanying
45
substance to be statistically meaningful. 1
Moreover, as a practical matter, the fixed periods of time devoted to
particular studies may not be long enough to capture diseases
manifesting after long latency periods. 46 Cancer, for instance, is
characterized by latency periods varying from five to perhaps forty years,

140. See Abigail C. Saguy, Employment Discrimination or Sexual Violence?
Defining Sexual Harassmentin American and French Law, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1091,
1093 (2000) (discussing the author's own research design, and the limited two-country
sample size used).
141. See COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 129, at 39-40; David H. Kaye, Is Proofof
Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1357-62 (1986) (explaining
the statistical concept of power).
142. See Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundry Drawing and the Need for ContextSensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 41 (1966) (explaining that "[i]f researchers use a sample which is
quite small in a study to detect relatively rare diseases, such as those typical of many
cancers, and either the researcher or judge insists on less than a .05 chance of false
positives, there is a risk of high false negatives or low statistical power").
143. CRANOR, supra note 126, at 32.
144. See id. at 34.
145. E.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed.
Reg. 38652, 38656 n.7 (July 18, 1997) (reporting that, "[o]ver the course of a year, the
few peak 24-hour concentrations of [particulate matter, or 'PM'] appeare[d] to contribute
a relatively small amount to the total health risk posed by the entire air quality
distribution as compared to the aggregated risks associated with the low to mid-range
concentrations," and that there was "greater uncertainty about both the existence and the
magnitude of estimated excess mortality and other effects associated with PM exposures
as one considers increasingly lower concentrations approaching background levels").
146. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertaintyin Mass Exposure Litigation, 74
TEx. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995).
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and to thoroughly detect causal factors the epidemiologists would have 47
to
monitor exposed and non-exposed groups over such extended periods.1
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the very long-term studies
required to track diseases characterized by long latency periods, "crosssectional" epidemiological studies examine exposures and diseases at
particular points in time.1 48 The temporal connection between the
exposure and the condition is uncertain, and so the ability to draw any
causal inference is limited.1 49 Nonetheless, courts presiding over mass
tort litigations have sometimes concluded that "cross-sectional studies
are valid and generally accepted study designs in epidemiology" if the
temporal relationship between50 the exposures and the outcomes is
considered and controlled for.1
Additionally, any single epidemiological study may be vulnerable to
biases and the influence of extraneous details that would tend to factor
out if more studies were conducted.' 5' Along these lines, Thomas Cook,
a Faculty Fellow at the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern
University, and Donald Campbell, during his lifetime an eminent social
psychologist and Schweitzer Professor in the Maxwell School at
Syracuse University, jointly commented that "[s]ince single operations
both underrepresent constructs and contain irrelevancies, construct
validity will be lower in single exemplar research than in research where
each construct
is multiply operationalized in order to triangulate on the
52
referent."'
Further, a study may be of limited usefulness, and the translatability
of causal inferences may be impaired, if the exposure histories of the
study's subjects tend toward one extreme or the other. If, for instance, an
epidemiological study examines asbestos miners exposed to
extraordinarily high dosages of toxic fibers, its findings may not readily

147. See Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, The
Controversy over Electromagnetic Fields and Possible Adverse Health Effects, at
http://www.arpansa.gov.au/isemf.htm (last visited May 5, 2003).
148. See Loue, supra note 52, at 268.
149. See id.
150. Allen v. IBM, Civil Action No. 94-264-LON, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8016, at
*79 (D. Del. May 19, 1997).
151. See, e.g., Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 222 (Pa.
Com. P1. 1996) (reporting in Bendectin case that defendant Merrell Dow had performed
only one epidemiological evaluation, which appeared to contain "design and supervision
problems, as well as other errors and irregularities").
152. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 129, at 65; cf Douglas Crawford-Brown,
Scientific Models of Human Health Risk Analysis in Legal andPolicy Decisions, 64 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 65-66 (2001) (opining that risk evaluation entails analysis of the
risk agent, the potentially affected population group, and the conditions under which
exposures may occur, and that judgments of risk must therefore involve the community
of scientists, not single assessments).
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translate to workers more moderately exposed.' 53
D. Measurement Error
A study's descriptive accuracy will depend significantly (albeit not
wholly) on the accuracy of its measurements. Epidemiological studies
test causal theories that connect variables to the data, and because the
quality of the data depends on measurement, inaccuracies
can throw the
1 54
study off and result in problematic conclusions.
Measuring is often a matter of classifying, and so misclassifications
count as measurement errors. 155 Consider, for instance, a study of the
exposure to asbestos among insulators constructing battleships at a
particular naval facility. If the researcher counts the dust emanating from
nearby cutting operations as generating a certain level of airborne
asbestos fibers, when in reality the cut materials happen to be asbestosfree-or inversely should she deem true asbestos sources to be
innocuous-then the classification errors will entail measurement
inaccuracy. Exposure misclassifications naturally engender biases in the
156
risk estimates.
Apart from classifying inaccurately, measurements of the same
phenomenon may be so varied as to be unreliable.15 7 Unreliability
prevents the observer from drawing any causal inference with a requisite
degree of confidence. As one scholar suggests, a particular laboratory
might attempt to assess the presence of benzene in an air sample, but find
randomly varying concentrations of benzene in parts per million, within
1 percent of the mean value, with each attempt. 158 Thus, a researcher
using the laboratory's findings may not be able to link the dose
associated with that air sample to the subject's response, and any causal
153. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 52-53 (D. Minn.
1974) (questioning whether asbestos exposures in a community setting are comparable to
exposures among asbestos workers).
154. See Vern R. Walker, The Structure of Factual Inference in Judicial Settings:
Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the Possible Sources of Error in Inferences, 22
CARDOzO L. REV. 1523, 1547 (2001) (explaining that "[m]easurement is the process of
classifying individual objects or events into the categories of a variable, and it generates
the data for a scientific study").
155. See PAUL GUSTAFSON, MEASUREMENT ERROR AND MISCLASSIFICATION
STATISTICS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY: IMPACTS AND BAYESIAN ADJUSTMENTS (2003).

IN

156. See Rebecca A. Johnson & Elizabeth V. Wattenberg, Risk Assessment of
Phenoxy Herbicides: An Overview of the Epidemiology and Toxicology Data, at
http://www.24d.org/chapter3.pdf (last visited May 5, 2003) (explaining that "differential
misclassification" occurs when the measurement error is sensitive to disease status,
whereas "nondifferential misclassification" is independent of disease status).
157. EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
ASSESSMENT 12 (1979).
158. Walker, supra note 154, at 1547-48.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:2

assessment would be problematic.
Testing for distributions of error is usually not too difficult in the
physical sciences because the conditions can be altered in a controlled
manner. 159 When studying human populations, however, testing for error
is problematic for a number of reasons. People and their circumstances
change over time, and individuals may alter their behavior,
subconsciously or intentionally, when under examination.' 60 Moreover,
the population of factory workers, semiconductor "clean room"
employees, or shipyard crew members assessed one month may be
differently composed the next.
Apart from problems of assessing measurement reliability,
researchers must account for measurement validity.'6 1
Reliable
measurement does not ensure validity, as "a measurement process is
valid only when it measures precisely what the researcher intends it to
measure."' 162 The researcher first has to conceptualize her terms and
categories in a way that coheres with an approach taken in the relevant
scientific community. One industrial hygienist may use the term
asbestos worker to define any employee working in spaces containing
more than a predefined minimum threshold level of asbestos
concentration; another may reserve the term for those who mined or
otherwise handled raw asbestos fibers. Thus, it is important to clarify
research terms with sufficient precision to avoid ambiguous readings on
the part of a given study's targeted audience.
The researcher then refines the definitions by making them
operational. 163 A study of a population exposed to asbestos may examine
those exposed in shipyards, or in the asbestos mines, or in insulation
manufacturing plants.
The operational definitions provide study
parameters, but conceptual narrowing has to fit the study's ultimate aims;
measurement validity is placed at risk if operational definitions are so
tight as to block out important data, or so broad as to permit
contamination by extraneous factors. 164 An unrepresentative sample
159. Id. at 1548 (noting that "[flor many measurement processes, especially in the
physical sciences, we can conduct reliability studies to determine distributions of error
under different sets of circumstances"); cf David Friedman, More Justice For Less
Money, 39 J. L. & EcoN. 211, 231 (1996) (suggesting that even in the soft science of
economics, procedural modifications may help control for error distributions).
160. Walker, supra note 154, at 1548.
161. See David P. Farrington, Methodological Quality Standards for Evaluation
Research, 587 ANNALS 49, 59 (2003).
162. Walker, supra note 154, at 1548-49 (citing EDWIN E. GHISELLI ET AL.,
MEASUREMENT THEORY FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 266 (1981)).
163. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS XXI (4th ed. 1994).

164. See Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing":
Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 33 (2000)
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group, resulting from an ill-conceived operational definition, will taint
the validity of a study's measurement procedure.165 In general, invalid
measurement will impair the researcher's ability to interpret the data in a
meaningful way.' 66 Concerns about measurement validity thus intersect
with some of the design and construct validity issues previously
discussed. 167
E. Conclusion
Validity threats may impair the usefulness of epidemiological
studies in toxic tort litigations, regardless of whether the studies are
proffered in satisfaction of a bright-line statistical assessment of
causation or as the complement to case-specific proof such as differential
diagnosis. The probativeness of the two-fold relative risk finding may
prove illusory if the study or studies generating that outcome are
themselves seriously flawed.
On the other hand, properly-constructed studies using sound
measurement procedures and well-planned sampling techniques should
prove significantly probative-even for minor increases in relative riskwhen offered in conjunction with the case-specific elimination of
confounding factors. Moreover, plaintiffs able to demonstrate flaws in
epidemiological studies proffered by toxic tort defendants will thereby
indirectly bolster the persuasiveness of their own causal proofs, even if
these are otherwise weak. 168 Thus, a finding that plaintiffs causation
evidence is admissible will usually thwart a defendant's motion for
(noting that "[d]ifficulties in crafting acceptable operational definitions may expose
inconsistencies or internal contradictions in the theory itself'); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, supra note 163 (reporting that "[t]he concept of mental disorder, like many other
concepts in medicine and science, lacks a consistent operational definition that covers all
situations").
165. Fridah W. Mugo, Sampling in Research, at
http://trochim.human.comell.edu/tutorial/mugo/tutorial.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2003).
166. See generally Fatimah L.C. Jackson, Anthropological Measurement: The
Mismeasure of African Americans, 568 ANNALS 154 (2000); David B. Wilson, MetaAnalytic Methods for Criminology, 578 ANNALS 71, 77 (2001).
167. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text; see generally Barnes, supra note
130, at 201-04 (also discussing extrapolation error (e.g., in inferring a "but for" causal
relationship between the defendant's misconduct and the plaintiff's harm), hypothesis
testing error (e.g., in assumptions made about the credibility of the evidence), and
statistical modeling error (e.g., in assumptions about the interrelationships among
variables and how the variables may affect outcomes)).
168. Cf Pick v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1160 (E.D. La. 1997)
(ironically finding that the epidemiological evidence proffered by the plaintiffs did not
support their claim that silicone can induce autoimmune disease, but also that, "from the
Daubert standpoint, the methodology is arguably flawed due to the nature of the alleged
disease and the design restrictions in the studies," and therefore that "the epidemiological
evidence does not definitively rule out such a connection").
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summary judgment.
V.
A.

The Acceptability of Epidemiological Statistics in Legal Cases
Introduction-Admissibility

So far this article has argued that the abolitionists' concern about
.the difficulties of establishing causation in toxic tort cases is best
addressed, not by constructing toxic tort litigation as a discrete
subspecies of tort law in which the causation element is erased
wholesale, but by relaxing the plaintiffs evidentiary burden through
expanded reliance upon epidemiological statistical evidence. The idea
finding some acceptance in the caselaw has been that proof of a two-fold
epidemiological increase in relative risk can satisfy the civil more-likelythan-not burden of persuasion, and that some additional case-specific
evidence, most likely differential diagnoses, may allow for the
assignment of bonus probabilities confirming the probative value of
those epidemiological
proofs that indicate less than a two-fold relative
69
risk ratio. 1
But should epidemiological evidence-even assuming an ideal
study free of validity threats-be admitted at all in legal cases on the
issue of specific causation, either as the sole evidence of causation when
they establish a greater than 2.0 relative risk factor, or in conjunction
with case-specific proof when they do not? After all, epidemiology
addresses only the issue of general causation, and even a slight increase
in relative risk above 1.0-factoring in a stipulated confidence levelindicates that the substance under study is capable of causing the
injurious outcome. In Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp.,'7 ° for example,
the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the epidemiological finding of a
1.24 relative risk showed a "significant statistical correlation" between
silicone and increased antinuclear antibodies,' 7' yet concluded that this
level of "association
is far removed from proving [specific]
72
causation."'
However, if statistically significant relative risk ratios less than 2.0
but greater than 1.0 demonstrate a capability to cause the outcome, then
this evidence is probative and should not be deemed inadmissible on
relevancy grounds.1 73
If such a study survives the court's
169. See supra notes 44-77.
170. 184 F.3d 1300 (1 th Cir. 1999).
171. Id. at 1315.
172. Id. at l315 n.16.
173. Courts opining otherwise, as in Mr. Maiorana's case in In re Eastern and
Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, or in the intermediate appellate ruling in
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methodological scrutiny under Daubert, it should be admitted, although
it remains possible that an expert's conclusion about specific causation
based solely on the study would itself fail to meet Evidence Rule 702's
requirement
that the expert's testimony be "based upon sufficient facts or
71 4
data."'

B.

The Statistical Turn

The traditional trend in legal theorizing about statistical evidence
has been to explain, in various ways, why naked statistical proofs are not
acceptable, and will not be admitted for the jury's consideration. For
example, the paradigmatic case standing for the exclusion of statistical
testimony had been People v. Collins,175 in which a couple robbed the
complainant in the San Pedro area of Los Angeles. 176 One of the robbers
was an African American male having a mustache and beard, and driving
a yellow car; the other was a white woman, just over five feet tall, with a
blonde ponytail. 177 The defendants fit the descriptions of the robbers,
78
and at the time of the robbery were in the San Pedro area.
At the trial the prosecutor proffered the testimony of a mathematics
instructor to establish that, given the robbers' joint characteristics, there
was an overwhelming probability that any couple matching their
description had been the assailants. 7 9
The prosecutor assigned
individual probabilities to a number of the characteristics common to the
robbers and the defendants-a 1/1000 probability, for example, that an
interracial couple would be in a car together in Los Angeles; a 1/10
probability that a "Negro" man would have a beard, and so forth-and
the witness applied the statistical "product rule" to conclude that there
was no more than a one in twelve million chance that any couple
possessed the defendants' notable characteristics. 80 The jury convicted
the defendants.' 81
On appeal, the Collins court held that the admission of the statistical
evidence was prejudicial error.182 First, the testimony lacked an adequate
foundation, because there was no evidence underwriting the individual
Landrigan,have been confused. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
174. FED. R. EVID. 702; see supra note 75.
175. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
176. Id. at 34.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. ld. at 37.
180. Id. at 38. To illustrate the product rule, the mathematician explained that the
probability of rolling a "2" on any one roll of a die is 1/6, and that the probability of
rolling two "2's" in succession is 1/6 x 1/6, or 1/36. Id at 37 n.8.
181. Id. at 33.
182. Id. at 38-39.
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probabilities, and because the individual factors were not shown to have
been statistically independent. 183 Second, said the court, the entire
statistical evidentiary exercise "was gravely misguided. At best, it might
yield an estimate as to how infrequently bearded Negroes drive yellow
cars in the company of blonde females with ponytails." 184 The crucial
question, however, not addressed by the statistical surmise was: which
that might fit the defendants' description had
of the few couples, if any,
185
committed the robbery?
A second paradigmatic and oft-mentioned case is Smith v. Rapid
Transit, Inc.' 86 A bus, negligently driven, forced Smith's car off the
road, but Smith could not identify the bus line. 187 The court accepted
that, mathematically, it was more likely than not that the defendant
owned the bus. 188 But this was not enough. 89 For example, said the
court, quoting from its earlier opinion in Sargent v. Massachusetts
Accident Company,'90 "the fact that colored automobiles made in the
current year outnumber black ones would not warrant a finding that an
undescribed automobile of the current year is colored and not black, nor
would the fact that only a minority of men die of cancer warrant a
finding that a particular man did not die of cancer." 19'
These days, however, courts recognize that, in a way, all evidence is
probabilistic, if only because no evidence is certain.192 As Judge Posner
explained:
What powers the intuition that the plaintiff should lose the bus case is
not the explicitly probabilistic nature of the evidence, but the
evidentiary significance of missing evidence. If the 51/49 statistic is
the plaintiffs only evidence, the inference to be drawn is not that
there is a 51 percent probability that it was a bus owned by A that hit
183. Id. By contrast, we derive the 1/6 probability in the exemplar from the known
fact that the die has six faces. Moreover, were the die biased in such a way that the
probability of rolling a "2" following any prior roll of a "2" was greater or less than 1/6,
then the product rule would fail.
184. Id.at 40.
185. Id. An issue is whether the real problem in Collins-like situations is that the
police are likely to stop their investigation once they have found a single match. The
correct statistical question should be: how likely is it, when police continue to select
couples out of the suspect population pool, that they would get more than one match?
186. 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
187. Id. at 754-55.
188. Id.at 755.
189. Id.
190. 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940).
191. Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 755 (quoting Sargent, 29 N.E.2d at 827).
192. See Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, 160 F.3d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1998). More
formally, however, "statistical" evidence involves observations that are interpreted under
a probability model. See Beverly G. Mellon, A Likelihood Approach to DNA Evidence,
in STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 52, at 125, 128.
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the plaintiff. It is that the plaintiff either investigated and discovered
that the bus was actually owned by B (and B might not have been...
judgment-proof and so not worth suing), or that he simply has not
bothered to conduct an investigation. If the first alternative is true, he
should of course lose; and since it may be true, the probability that
the plaintiff was hit by a bus owned by A is less than 51 percent and
the plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof. If the second
alternative is true-the plaintiff
just hasn't conducted an
193
investigation-he still should lose.

Litigants increasingly rely on scientific evidence, and its use in legal
cases has grown exponentially since Collins, Smith, and Sargent were
decided. 94 The general tendency is to permit evidence having a
statistical component under the standards that govern other scientific
proofs. 195
As construed by the courts, beginning with Cook,
epidemiological studies showing a relative risk greater than 2.0 say that
there is greater than a 50 percent probability that any individual who both
was exposed to toxic substance E and contracted disease would not
have contracted absent the exposure to ).196 In the final analysis, this
is not too different from the sort of proof rejected in Smith.
The statistical turn in evidentiary practice occurred in the late 1980s
in the context of molecular genetics, and dealt with deoxyribonucleic
acid, or DNA, which is the double-stranded molecule that carries an
individual's genetic code. In the rape and murder case of Spencer v.
193.
194.

Howard, 160 F.3d at 360.
See FEDERAL CTS. STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 97 (1990) (noting that "[e]conomic, statistical, technological, and natural and
social scientific data are becoming increasingly important in both routine and complex
litigation"); see generally Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic
Causation: The Content of Scientific Proofand the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 181, 382 (1993) (emphasizing that courts are increasingly relying upon
scientific evidence in toxic tort cases); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting
Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific
Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 996 (1994) (arguing that the idea of court-appointed experts
is likely to receive increasing attention as the Daubert admissibility criteria, governing
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, are applied to the growing amount of scientific
and technical evidence used in litigations); Brenda Inman Rowe, Note, A Possible
Solution for the Problem of Juries Slighting Nonscientific Evidence: A Bayesian-Like
JudicialInstruction, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 541, 542 (1997) (discussing the speculation about
whether juries are capable of evaluating "the sophisticated scientific evidence that is
increasingly used in criminal trials").
195. See FEDERAL CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 194, at 97.
196. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990);
Sanderson v. International Flavors & Fragrances, 950 F. Supp. 981, 999-1000 (C.D. Cal.
1996); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996); In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (asserting that
plaintiffs must prove at least a two-fold increase in the incidence of the disease allegedly
caused by exposure to the suspected toxic substance).
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Commonwealth, 197 for instance, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained
the testing process comparing the defendant's DNA to that taken from
semen stains at the crime scene. 198 Based on the initial database that had
been available at the trial, the court reported that "the chance that anyone
' 99
other than Spencer produced the semen stains was one in 135 million.",
The updated database, available later in the trial, decreased the
probability of a random match to one in 705 million.20 0 Upholding
Spencer's conviction based in part on this evidence, the court concluded
that DNA testing was a reliable scientific technique, and that the tests
had been properly conducted in the case.20 1
Courts now overwhelmingly accept DNA evidence.20 2 Because the
theory underlying the science is well established, legal challenges tend to
be case specific, concerning such matters as the technical handling of
samples, possible contamination, laboratory techniques, interpretive
ambiguities, and possible matches between crime scene samples and
innocent members of the suspect population.20 3 William Thompson, a
professor in the Department of Criminology, Law, and Society at the
University of California, notes the view of some experts that having valid
estimates of laboratory error rates is as important as having valid
frequency estimates.20 4 Statistics concerning DNA frequencies permit
the scientist to estimate the probability of a coincidental match that might
implicate an innocent person; on top of that, however, collection,
handling, processing, and typing problems can result in false positives,
and legal opponents challenging the use of DNA evidence may focus on
these vulnerabilities.2 °5
Concerning the possible misinterpretations of DNA proofs by
courtroom players, statistician David Balding describes both the

197. 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
198. Id. at 781-82.
199. Id.at 783.
200. Id.at 791.
201. Id.at 783.
202. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The DNA Story: An Alternative View, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 380 (1997) (critiquing the overwhelming judicial acceptance).
203. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 25-1.2, at 211 (2002).

204. William C. Thompson, Forensic DNA Evidence, in EXPERT EVIDENCE: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (Patrick Lee & Bert Black eds., 1997), quoted in RICHARD 0.
LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS

AND CASES 1117, 1134 (3d ed. 2000).
205. Id.; see also Seymour Geisser, Statistics, Litigation, and Conduct Unbecoming,
in STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 52, at 73 (noting that
the variable numbers of tandem repeats probed during DNA enzyme cutting are subject
to measurement error using the restricted fragment length polymorphisms method, also
discussed in the Spencer case).
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"prosecutor's fallacy" and the "defendant's fallacy., 20 6 The prosecutor
may tend to conflate the notion of"A implies B" with "B implies A," thus
taking P (A/B)-or the probability of A given B-to imply P (B/A). 207
From the calculation demonstrating that the probability of the DNA
evidence given a suspect's innocence is very small, one cannot infer that
the probability that the suspect is innocent, given the DNA evidence, is
comparably small.20 8
Defense counsel, on the other hand, may construe a DNA profile
frequency of one in one million to imply that, in a population pool of one
hundred million individuals, the probability that the defendant is guilty is
only one in one hundred, or p = .01. This, says Balding, ignores
background information-temporal, spatial, relational, and so forth-that
almost always exists to some extent, and that will make some individuals
more likely suspects than others.20 9
It is obvious that epidemiological evidence will not pinpoint the
cause of a harm with the precision of a DNA proof. In some ways,
however, the trier of fact may be less likely to misestimate the probative
quality of the epidemiological showing-less likely, that is, to be
overwhelmed by the numbers. Even if made aware of fallacious
courtroom interpretations, and the mishandling of biological samples, a
figure representing an outcome as one in 705 million not only will carry
more probative force, but will hold more potentially prejudicial sway,
than will a relative risk ratio of approximately 2.0.
In all events, the question is whether the statistical turn that has
allowed for the introduction of DNA evidence will be wide enough to
sweep in epidemiological statistical outcomes. A brief look at some of
the theoretical work that has debated the use of statistical proofs should
help address this issue.
C. A TheoreticalJustification
The final issue is thus whether law and society will deem legal
outcomes that hinge upon epidemiological proofs to be legitimate. The
normative engine driving the legal system has been variously described
as a search for truth, 21° a ritual by which to realize the peaceful
settlements of social conflicts, 21' a mechanism for promoting fairness,
David J. Balding, InterpretingDNA Evidence: Can ProbabilityTheory Help?, in
65-66.
207. Id. at 65.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 66.
210. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (prescribing that the evidentiary rules shall be construed,
inter alia, toward the end of ascertaining the truth).
211. Tribe, supra note 84, at 1376.
206.

STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 52, at
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justice, and efficiency, 212 a means for projecting desirable norms and
214
legal rules to society, 2 13 and a vehicle for producing stable outcomes.
Scholars have traditionally objected to statistical proofs because
they appear to conflict with one or more of these normative goals.
Tribe's famous paper expresses special skepticism about the ability of
lay fact finders to assign Bayesian prior probabilities to a set of initial
facts. 21 5 Tribe rails against the "dehumanization of justice" that would
result from forcing jurors to quantify the acceptable risk they are willing
to run of sentencing an innocent defendant to prison.21 6 Harvard Law
Professor Charles Nesson, advancing the thesis that law projects
normative legal rules, objects to statistical proofs that may transform the
message from one of morality to one of "crude risk calculation. 2 17
The standing objections to the use of statistical proofs were
primarily descriptive, being explanations of why courts were not, in fact,
permitting the introduction of such proofs.218 The description no longer
applies to DNA evidence, and it is useful to explore some of the ways in
which this statistical approach overcomes the traditional objections. If
epidemiology's statistical findings are increasingly accepted, then the
emerging shift applies to this area of the scientific evidence as well.
The most salient factor counseling the introduction of both DNA
and epidemiological proof may be need. Need sometimes drives

212. See Gerald Torres, Law, Knowledge, and the Academy: Translationand Stories,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363 (2002).
213. Nesson, supra note 22, at 1357; see also EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF
LABOR IN SOCIETY 108 (G. Simpson trans. 1933) (arguing that legal outcomes and
punishments are designed to convey norms to upright citizens).
214. See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 29 (2002) (stressing that "[t]he judge must
ensure stability with change, and change with stability").
215. Tribe, supra note 84, at 1358.
216. Id. at 1372-76.
217. Nesson, supra note 22, at 1362. But cf Robert L. Birmingham & Nancy J.
Dunham, An Evidentiary Value Reading of Naked StatisticalProofs, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J.
797, 817 (1987) (critiquing Nesson's argument objecting to the use of statistical proofs
and proposing a new model rooted in the sensitivity of the evidentiary mechanism to
principal facts).
218. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1240 (D.C.N.Y.
1985); see also David L. Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REV. 209 (1981); Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological
Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 431 (1983);
Richard J. Heafey, Trial by Lottery: The Misuse of Epidemiology and Statistics To Prove
Causation in Drug and Chemical Litigation, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 19 (1988); Donald
W. Large & Preston Michie, Proving that the Strength of the British Navy Depends on
the Number of Old Maids in England A Comparison of Scientific Proof with Legal
Proof, 11 ENVTL. L. 555, 563-68 (1981); Richard W. Wright, Causation,Responsibility,
Risk, Probability,Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying
the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1061-65 (1988).
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evidentiary policy. 219 Illustratively, DNA findings have resulted in the
exoneration of a significant number of individuals wrongly convicted.2 2 °
Used for inculpatory purposes, the DNA analysis may be the most
probative way of linking the defendant to the semen found at the crime
scene,22 ' the assailant's blood shed in the struggle,2 22 the clump of hair
taken from the victim's fist. 223 With respect to epidemiological proof,
the abolitionists do a good job of showing why, at a minimum, the
traditional principles for establishing specific causation need to be
relaxed in toxic tort litigations.2 24 Accordingly, the need factor
characterizing the judicial acceptance of DNA proof and of
epidemiological outcomes is comparable.
A second important factor, which must accompany any showing of
need, is reliability. It is now beyond dispute that the genetic science
underlying DNA research and epidemiological methodologies are both

219. See, for example, the advisory committee note accompanying FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(2), which explains that the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule is
rooted traditionally in "the exceptional need for the evidence in homicide cases."
220.

See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 (2000) (discussing sixty-

seven DNA exonerations obtained by Cardozo Law School's Innocence Project); see also
EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996)

(discussing twenty-eight cases); Jennifer Boemer, Granting Post-Conviction
DeoxyribonucleicAcid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1971, 19972000 (2001) (noting that most of the Innocence Project's exonerations involved a
situation in which the DNA technology responsible had not been available at the time of
trial); Naftali Bendavid, For Innocent, DNA Proving Sturdy Ally in Five Years-The
Innocence Project has Freed 32 Convicts Through DNA Testing, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27,
1997, at A4; see also Mark Donald, Lethal Rejection: Jeanette Popp Still Mourns Her
Murdered Daughter. Now She's Become a Compelling Voice in the Debate over the
Death Penalty. Guess Which Side, DALLAS OBSERVER, Dec. 12, 2002 (reporting that,
"[a]ccording to the Innocence Project, false confessions or admissions were involved in
27 of the first 1 1 post-conviction DNA exonerations in this country. Last week in
Manhattan, prosecutors would ask a judge to throw out the conviction of five men in the
infamous 'Central Park jogger' case, after DNA evidence proved that the confessions
given by the men-imprisoned for 13 years-were false.").
221. E.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth., 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
222. E.g., State v. Thompson, WD 57595, 2001 Mo. App. LEXIS 903, at *12 (June 5,
2001) (discussing testimony that "it is common to find a trail of the assailant's blood
leading from the victim's body to the bathroom, where assailants go to clean up and tend
to their wounds"), rev'd on othergrounds, 68 S.W.3d 393 (Mo. 2002).
223. E.g., State v. Brooks, C1-01-1253, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS 651, at *9-10 (June
11, 2002) (noting that defense counsel had elected not to obtain DNA results on the hair
found in the victim's hand because they suspected it might have been the defendant's
hair).
224. But see Todd D. Brown, Comment, The Power Line Plaintiff and the Inverse
CondemnationAlternative, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 655, 666 (1992) (reasoning from
traditional law school principles, asserting that "[b]asing liability on the results of
epidemiological data not only would be improper, but would violate the well-established
legal precedent that a plaintiff must prove actual causation to recover in tort").
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well accepted in the respective scientific communities. 5
This is not to say, of course, that the computation of the percentage
of blue buses operating in a particular city, or of the proportion of
colored to black cars sold, might be unreliable. But it is to say that such
computations should not be systematically needed in types of litigation
that occur repeatedly. Even in the isolated case, such as Smith, when
naked statistics may be the only evidence linking a party to an event,
need is questionable. As Judge Posner has stated, the diligence of the
party proffering the proof is most immediately implicated. 2 6
It will seldom be the case, however, that parties will offer DNA or
epidemiological evidence as a smokescreen to cover a lax investigation.
The effort they must make to obtain these sorts of scientific data will
alone not be insignificant. Moreover, the proponents of this evidence
must already have worked hard to create a suitable litigation context
receptive to the information. They must be in a position to assert, for
instance, that the epidemiological findings fit their clients' exposure
histories, occupational environments, and so forth. But, at the same time,
the burdens should ordinarily not be so extensive or prohibitive as to
justify an outright abolition of the causal dimension, pace Berger.
Nor are legal outcomes predicated on DNA and epidemiological
forms of statistical proof vulnerable to destabilization, either because
new evidence may readily emerge to discredit the judgment, or because
the community may be able to engage in the statistical computation on its
own, hence impugning the need for discrete juries and evidentiary
presentations. Under the Collins scenario, for instance, it is possible that
another couple matching the assailants' descriptions might be spotted

225. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1990)
(noting that "the reliability of expert testimony founded on reasoning from
epidemiological data is generally a fit subject for judicial notice; epidemiology is a wellestablished branch of science and medicine, and epidemiological evidence has been
accepted in numerous cases"); James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out"
School DesegregationExplained,90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1521-22 (1990) (recognizing
that "litigants and judges in toxic tort cases can utilize the conclusions of a wellestablished and scientifically accepted medical field-epidemiology-to determine
whether and with what frequency certain chemical agents cause certain kinds of cancer");
William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 79 (1989) (reporting that DNA
sequencing has become well accepted in the scientific community since it was developed
in the early 1970s, and has "certainly become a key tool in the field of molecular
biology"); see also Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, Comment, DNA Identification
Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903, 954 (1988) (noting that the ability to link
DNA outcomes to individuals is well established in the scientific community, and that
"non-forensic DNA tests are used extensively in other scientific disciplines,
demonstrating their reliability and acceptance by the general scientific community").
226. See supra note 192.

2003]

GENERAL CAUSATION AT A CROSSROADS

somewhere near the San Pedro area.22 7 Under the Smith scenario, the
ritual performance of a jury trial would simply seem gratuitous were the
proportion of vehicles
outcome merely to hinge on an assessment of the 228
owned and operated by a defendant in a given city.
If one accepts Nesson's Durkheimian view of verdicts-that they
project norms because they are about past events, not the evidence 229-it
is again doubtful that the admission of DNA and epidemiological proofs
will rub one the wrong way. Perceiving that legal outcomes have rested
on the practically irrefutable statistical connection discovered between a
defendant's blood type and the assailant's sperm (when tests on each
reveal statistically matching DNA), or on the showing of relative risk
that demonstrates the causal capabilities of a manufacturer's product,
otherwise conscientious citizens are not likely, on this basis, to take their
chances in some malevolent or hazardous scheme.23 °
It is also significant that the presentation of DNA or
epidemiological evidence does not threaten to transmogrify the triers of
fact into amateur statisticians. In his landmark evidentiary piece, Tribe
reacted against a proposal jointly authored by Michael Finkelstein,
Professor of Law at the Columbia University School of Law, and
William Fairley, a Harvard-trained statistician, that expert witnesses be
brought into legal cases to help jurors engage in an explicitly Bayesian
The DNA or
assessment of their probability functions.231
epidemiological proffer, by contrast, leaves intact the juror's everyday
If the ordinary juror organizes the
computational apparatus.2 32
information revealed at trial into a narrative story "in which causal and
intentional relations between events are central, 2 33 this sort of statistical
227. Seesupra notes 175-85.
228. See supra notes 186-91.
229. Nesson, supra note 22, at 1362 n. 17.
230. See also Birmingham & Dunham, supra note 217, at 804 (asking "[p]ractically,
would a citizen, upon observing in the prisoner case that the state prevailed not on an
ordinary eyewitness proof, but on a .96 probability obtained by a naked statistical proof,
for that reason resolve, 'I will murder if it is expedient that I do so'?"). This critique
applies, of course, even against traditionally condemned statistical proofs.
231. Tribe, supra note 84, at 1354; Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A
Bayesian Approach to IdentificationEvidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1970) (suggesting
that Bayesian probability analysis be incorporated in certain trial settings); see also
Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Processes of Proof,66
B.U. L. REv. 439, 476 (1986) (arguing that the use of Bayes's Theorem would augment
"justice in the sense of accurate verdicts").
232. See Alan M. Turing, Computing, Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND 433
(1950) (asking "can machines think?" and devising his "imitation game" substituting a
machine for a man); see also Ray C. Paton et al., An Examination of Some Metaphorical
Contextsfor Biologically Motivated Computing, 45 BRITISH J.PHIL. SCIENCE 505 (1994).
233. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
Making, 51 J.PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 242, 243 (1986); see generally W. LANCE
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presentation should not throw her off course.
All of this being said, it is also reasonable to expect that the new
acceptance of statistical forms of proof will spur a shift in the legal
system's underlying normative commitments. If adjudications have
tended in the past to privilege the evidentiary mechanism's dispute
resolution function over its truth-seeking (and perhaps fairness) goals,
more precise technologies now threaten to destabilize those resolutions.
Recently, for instance, Manhattan District Attorney Robert M.
Morgenthau sought the dismissal of the judgments of conviction entered
against five men implicated in the notorious "Central Park jogger"
attack, asserting that new DNA evidence and a confession from an
alternative assailant had convinced him of their innocence.234
Epidemiology is not precise relative to molecular genetics.235 But if
the studies are demonstrably valid, their statistically significant findings
should be delivered to the trier of fact in the interests of fairness and
truth-seeking. Although a dispute resolution paradigm may counsel a
conservative approach to evidentiary standards in some cases, courts
should resist incentives to adhere to traditional notions of the burden of
persuasion on the issue of specific causation.
VI.

Conclusion

Traditional approaches to specific causation are not feasible in toxic
tort litigations. Scholars and jurists advocating an end to the causal
element in such cases lament that causality is profoundly elusive in the
toxic tort context both because biology does not explain the causal
mechanisms by which toxic exposures engender injuries, and because it
is difficult to trace any such injuries to any one particular source.
But it is not necessary to abolish the causal element altogether. On
the one hand, the abolitionist proposal likely faces insurmountable
institutional and jurisprudential obstacles. On the other hand, this
proposal is likely incoherent because it must presuppose some finding of
the general causal nexus that it seeks to bypass.
The middle way relies on the new judicial acceptance of certain
forms of statistical proof. Epidemiological findings, especially when
conjoined with case-specific differential diagnosis testimony, support
BENNETT & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE

AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 276-81 (1981) (advancing the story model of case

presentation).
234. See supra note 220; see also Tom Perrotta & Daniel Wise, Morgenthau Callsfor
Dismissal of All Jogger Case Convictions: District Attorney Persuaded by New DNA
Evidence and Confession, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 6, 2002, at 1.
235.
See generally SEAN B. CARROLL ET AL., FROM DNA TO DIVERSITY: MOLECULAR
GENETICS AND THE EVOLUTION OF ANIMAL DESIGN (2001).
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523

causal inferences and should be attainable in a wide variety of toxic tort
cases.
Although validity threats may impair the usefulness of
epidemiological studies in toxic tort litigations, properly-constructed
studies using sound measurement procedures and well-planned sampling
techniques should prove significantly probative when offered in
conjunction with the case-specific elimination of confounding factors.

